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Issues and Conclusions 
Indonesia in ASEAN 
Regional Leadership between 
Ambition and Ambiguity 
Supporting regional integration processes within 
the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) is an integral part of Europe’s stra-
tegic interests in South-East Asia. Hereby, Indonesia 
is viewed as Europe’s most important partner in the 
region and primus inter pares within ASEAN. Such a 
view is based first and foremost on the country’s sheer 
territorial dimension, its population of more than 240 
million, its vast domestic market, and its historical 
role as a founding member of the organisation. Addi-
tionally, it is Indonesia’s strategic location at the Strait 
of Malacca – one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes 
– which accounts for its importance. But more impor-
tantly, it has been Jakarta’s claim to exert regional 
leadership and its role as a driver of regional integra-
tion processes in ASEAN that have made Jakarta ap-
pear to be a crucial partner for Europe. The recurrent 
concepts of “ASEAN centrality” as well as ASEAN being 
the “cornerstone” of Indonesian foreign policy have 
been used by Indonesian academics and policy-makers 
to shape the understanding of Indonesia’s role in 
ASEAN, domestically and internationally. 
Under the administration of Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), 
however, indications seem to be growing stronger 
that Indonesia is “turning away” from ASEAN. This 
is because a new narrative about Indonesia’s role in 
ASEAN has apparently emerged in Jakarta since Jokowi’s 
ascent to office in October 2014. This narrative gives 
priority to Indonesia’s national interests over other 
long-standing hallmarks of Indonesian foreign policy 
– most notably the concept of “ASEAN centrality”, 
which, along with other foreign policy hallmarks, is to 
be rigorously scrutinized in terms of its compatibility 
with Indonesia’s national interests. Such apparent 
change, at least on the rhetorical level, sparked fears 
within the region and beyond over Indonesia disavow-
ing ASEAN shortly before the regional organisation 
met for the establishment of the ASEAN Community 
on 31 December 2015. Bear in mind that many of the 
ideas behind the formation of the ASEAN Community 
in no small part were crafted by Indonesia itself during 
previous administrations. Moreover, if Indonesia were 
to turn away from ASEAN, it would also have poten-
tially negative effects on the implementation of the 
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ASEAN Community’s Post-2015 Vision and its objective 
of further deepening the regional integration process 
by 2022, as it had been assumed that Indonesia would 
lead the process. Fears have been raised that, without 
active participation by Jakarta, the regional integra-
tion process could effectively become stalled. 
In order to be able to gauge changes in Indonesian 
foreign policy towards ASEAN under Jokowi, this 
research paper traces the role that ASEAN has played 
in Indonesian foreign policy – from the fall of Suharto 
up to the present day. Hereby, Indonesia’s contribu-
tions to the regional integration process since the mid-
2000s are of special importance to the analysis. The 
paper seeks to answer research questions via a com-
parative policy analysis. The selection of the six policy 
areas analysed in this study follows the three pillars 
of the ASEAN Community. Two policy areas were 
selected from each pillar: 
 ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) – “con-
flict- and crisis-management” and “counter-terror-
ism” 
 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) – “ASEAN Single 
Aviation Market (ASAM)” and “labour mobility” 
 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) – “dis-
aster management” and “haze and air pollution” 
The analytical approach hereby is twofold. In a first 
step, the analysis seeks to determine whether Indo-
nesia has acted as a visionary and agenda-setter at the 
regional level. In a second step, the analysis tries to 
assess whether the country has implemented regional 
agreements domestically. 
The results indicate that Indonesia’s role differs 
markedly from one policy field to the next. At times, 
these findings are starkly at odds with Jakarta’s self-
proclaimed role as the motor of ASEAN and driver of 
regional integration. It is mostly with regard to the 
first pillar – particularly in the area of regional secu-
rity –that Indonesia has developed key ideas for the 
region, served as one of the main architects behind 
the APSC, and backed up its own leadership role 
through a flurry of diplomatic activities. Indonesia’s 
leadership role in the APSC is based on the conviction 
– held by many in Jakarta, past and present – that only 
a well-integrated, functional ASEAN community can 
guarantee regional security and stability in South-East 
Asia. Furthermore, large parts of Indonesia’s political 
elites share the view that Indonesia’s global standing 
and influence is closely tied to its regional leadership 
position in ASEAN. 
At the same time, however, Jakarta has displayed 
attitudes towards the AEC – ranging predominantly 
from inert to negative – and largely failed to launch 
any ideas or policy initiatives regarding the deepening 
of regional economic integration in ASEAN. Out of 
(often well-founded) fears that Indonesia’s national 
economy would be unable to compete with competi-
tors from regional economic powerhouses such as 
Singapore and Malaysia, regional agreements have 
either been implemented in a very patchy manner 
or not been implemented at all. Moreover, there are 
indications that Jakarta’s defensive demeanour and 
foot-dragging with regard to the AEC could further 
increase under the Jokowi administration. 
Yet, Indonesia’s ambiguity towards ASEAN is, as 
the paper shows, not at all new or a unique feature of 
the Jokowi administration. Quite to the contrary, the 
paper finds strong continuities in Indonesia’s attitude 
towards – and behaviour in – ASEAN across different 
national administrations. Despite the common view 
that Indonesia returned to its “natural” position at the 
helm of ASEAN and quickly came to be regarded as 
the main driver of regional integration processes with 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (who often went by his 
initials SBY) ascent to power, Jakarta continued to be 
a difficult partner in the AEC, while at the same time 
exercising regional leadership in the APSC. Those fear-
ing that Indonesia will turn away from ASEAN tend 
to overlook many of the continuities present in Indo-
nesia’s role in ASEAN over the last decade or so. More-
over, because of Jakarta’s self-portrayal as the regional 
primus inter pares, any outright foreign policy change 
regarding ASEAN seems unlikely for the time being. 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that Indonesia, under 
the Jokowi administration, has yet to develop new 
ideas and derive new policy initiatives for the future 
development of ASEAN. It is against this background 
that Europe would be well advised to expand coopera-
tion with Indonesia as well as continue to beckon 
Jakarta to act as the motor of regional integration for 
the ASEAN Community post-2015. 
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Ambition and Ambivalence: Indonesia’s Historic Role in ASEAN 
 
The founding of ASEAN itself in 1967, as well as Indo-
nesia’s role during and after ASEAN’s founding, are 
inextricably linked to Indonesia’s foreign policy during 
the era of President Suharto (1965–1998). From the 
late 1950s onwards, Jakarta’s foreign policy had been 
significantly shaped by two processes: its rapproche-
ment with the Soviet Union and China, and its grow-
ing hostility (“konfrontasi”) towards the Federation of 
Malaya (later reconstituted as Malaysia), which was 
denounced by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, to 
be a bulwark of British imperialism and neo-colonial-
ism. These processes raised fears that Indonesia’s 
increasingly assertive, aggressive demeanour under 
the leadership of President Sukarno could destabilise 
the region. After General Suharto took power in 1965, 
Indonesian foreign policy underwent significant 
changes. Under Suharto, it was not the fight against 
imperialism and neo-colonialism but rather regional 
stability and cooperation that were deemed to be the 
prime foreign policy objectives of Indonesia. Winning 
back the trust of Indonesia’s neighbours and the 
West, reviving economic development through close 
relations with Western donors, as well as the overall 
rehabilitation of Indonesia became key priorities.1 
Accordingly, Indonesia played a key role during 
ASEAN’s founding, and then-Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik referred to the organisation as the “corner-
stone” of Indonesian foreign policy.2 Suharto viewed 
ASEAN as the right tool to tackle the tainted image of 
post-“konfrontasi” Indonesia.3 Hence, Jakarta’s 
behaviour during and after ASEAN’s founding has 
been shaped significantly by a desire to win back the 
trust of its neighbours via displays of self-restraint. 
Accordingly, Indonesia sought to portray itself as a 
moderate, peaceful, and reliable partner in the region 
and beyond.4 Next to rehabilitating Indonesia as a 
reliable partner, regional integration for Suharto also 
 
1  Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and 
Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
[ISEAS], 1994). 
2  Adam Malik, In the Service of the Republic (Singapore: Gunung 
Agung, 1980), 272. 
3  Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN (see note 1), 287. 
4  Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1983). 
included a security component. Regional integration 
was seen as a tool to foster peaceful, cooperative 
relations with Indonesia’s neighbours. Moreover, it 
was seen as a tool to reduce the influence of external 
powers in South-East Asia. It is especially the latter 
aspect that has impacted the political elites’ thinking 
about regional security until today. 
From the perception of the Suharto regime, it was 
Indonesia – as the biggest state in South-East Asia and 
a founding member of ASEAN – that was to play a key 
role in the development of ASEAN and the fostering of 
regional integration. Indonesia’s pretension to act as 
primus inter pares in ASEAN notwithstanding, a gap has 
existed since ASEAN’s founding between Indonesia’s 
claim to regional leadership on the one hand, and its 
inability or reluctance to govern regional affairs on the 
other.5 The reasons for this gap are to be found in the 
norms and the modus operandi of ASEAN, as well as 
Indonesia’s often highly ambivalent realpolitik vis-à-vis 
the organisation. Besides a commitment to neutrality 
– in order to extract the organisation from the Cold 
war imbroglio – a number of other basic principles are 
commonly referred to as the “ASEAN Way”. These in-
clude the principles of non-interference in the domes-
tic affairs of other member states, of peaceful conflict 
resolution, and of consensus decision-making (instead 
of majority voting). The principles of non-interference 
and consensus decision-making, however, have ham-
pered not only deeper regional integration but also 
the strengthening of regional institutions. As such, 
ASEAN has remained a strictly intergovernmental 
body, and there is no indication of interest in shared 
sovereignty and strong supranational institutions 
among its members. Hence, the organisation lacks any 
ability to sanction member states that break regional 
agreements. At the same time, the principle of con-
sensus decision-making enables smaller states to with-
stand the interests and policy preferences of regional 
heavyweights such as Indonesia. 
Taking this into consideration, the ASEAN Way mas-
sively impacts the manner in which member states 
can exert regional leadership. Member states’ material 
power resources – be they military, economic, or any-
 
5  Ibid., 181. 
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thing else – and the exercise of power through threat 
of coercion or through coercive power have taken 
a backseat in favour of “softer” aspects of regional 
leadership, such as agenda-setting, mediation, and 
innovation. Regional leadership in South-East Asia 
is therefore primarily to be understood as a “social 
category”.6 Member states that take on a leadership 
role in ASEAN do so on the basis of common norms 
and values rather than coercion. They are able to best 
exercise leadership if their behaviour is viewed as 
coherent with the perceived identities and interests 
as well as the objectives of the other member states.7 
That said, from the beginning, Indonesia’s ambigu-
ous stance towards greater regional integration 
has often been viewed as being inconsistent with the 
country’s self-perception as a regional leader and the 
declaration of ASEAN as being the “cornerstone” of 
Indonesian foreign policy. Especially in the field of 
economic integration, already during the Suharto era 
Indonesia began actively blocking or procrastinating 
about any measures that would deepen regional inte-
gration. To explain Indonesia’s ambivalence and am-
biguity with regard to regional integration, one has to 
consider at least three interrelated factors. First of all, 
economic interdependence between Indonesia and its 
neighbours is limited, and so are the potential benefits 
of further regional economic integration for Indo-
nesia’s national economy. Second, there is a view on 
economic cooperation in Jakarta that extends beyond 
the region in its search for potential partners. Third 
are the diverging interests of member states with 
regard to the key aspects of regional integration. For 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, the dominant 
prism through which regional integration has been 
viewed has traditionally been economic. For Indone-
sia, however, security aspects of regional integration – 
especially regional stability and regional resilience 
against the influence of external powers – have been 
the dominant prisms through which regional integra-
 
6  Daniel Flemes and Detlef Nolte, “Introduction”, in Regional 
Leadership in the Global System. Ideas, Interests and Strategies of 
Regional Powers, ed. Daniel Flemes (Ashgate: Farnham, 2010):  
1–14; Dirk Nabers, “Power, Leadership, and Hegemony in Inter-
national Politics: The Case of East Asia”, Review of International 
Studies 36, no. 4 (October 2010): 931–49. 
7  Daan van Knippenberg and Michael A. Hogg, “A Social Identity 
Model of Leadership Effectiveness in Organizations”, Research in 
Organizational Behavior 25 (2003): 243–95; Oran R. Young, “Politi-
cal Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of 
Institutions in International Society”, International Organization 
45, no. 3 (June 1991): 281–308. 
tion has been viewed and understood.8 In retrospect, it 
is necessary to acknowledge that Indonesia’s commit-
ment to ASEAN – as well as its willingness to push for, 
or procrastinate against, regional integration – has dif-
fered significantly across policy fields. The extent of this 
commitment has largely hinged on whether greater 
integration of Jakarta into ASEAN has been viewed as 
being beneficial or harmful to Indonesia’s perceived 
national interests.9 Nonetheless, Indonesia’s general 
image as regional leader and primus inter pares was 
never challenged outright during the Suharto era. 
This changed with the fall of Suharto. Indonesia’s 
“natural” leadership position in ASEAN was severely 
brought into question during a multitude of domestic 
challenges in the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997/98.10 
These challenges led Suharto’s successors Habibie, 
Wahid, and Megawati to focus primarily on domestic 
affairs, which in turn contributed less energy and 
fewer resources towards the exercising of regional 
leadership in ASEAN.11 Indonesia’s leadership crisis 
was – at least partially – overcome by the mid-2000s 
under the presidency of Yudhoyono, when improved 
domestic stability and economic growth enabled it to 
return to a more active role in the region. During the 
Bali summit in 2003, the member states decided to 
deepen regional integration in order to transform 
ASEAN into the ASEAN Community. Especially with 
regard to the security aspects of the ASEAN Communi-
ty, Indonesia did play a leading role. Besides, against 
the background of its own successful democratisation 
process, the country pushed for a stronger normative-
ly orientated community by introducing a number 
of initiatives to strengthen the protection of human 
rights in ASEAN. For example, it was due to the initia-
tive of Indonesia that the 2007 ASEAN charter pro-
vided for the establishment of a human rights com-
mission. At the same time, Jakarta also pushed for an 
overhaul of ASEAN’s traditional decision-making pro-
cess with the aim of altering the principle of consen-
sual decision-making. Among other things, Jakarta 
also pushed for the introduction of a mechanism to 
apply sanctions and increased financial contributions 
 
8  Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role 
in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), 24. 
9  Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN (see note 1), 277. 
10  These included the secession of East Timor (Timor Leste), the 
eruption and escalation of several violent secessionist and inter-
communal conflicts in various parts of the country, a manifest 
economic crisis, newly emerging terrorist threats, and a far-
reaching political transformations after 1998. 
11  Smith, Strategic Centrality (see note 8), 875. 
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by the member states to the ASEAN secretariat to im-
prove the dire financial resources of the secretariat. 
However, Indonesia’s return to the fore of ASEAN 
during the Yudhoyono presidency also revealed the 
continued existence of a gap between Jakarta’s am-
bitious rhetoric and realities on the ground. It was 
indeed Jakarta that heavily influenced ASEAN’s reform 
agenda and drove demands for a deepening of regional 
integration, thereby performing in line with its self-
ascription as the region’s norm entrepreneur and agenda-
setter.12 Yet, when engaging with the concrete formu-
lation of regional policies and their implementation, 
the limits of Indonesian leadership became apparent. 
Almost all reform initiatives fell victim to resistance 
from other ASEAN member states. Similarly, the 2007 
adoption of the ASEAN charter did not involve an 
overhaul of the ASEAN Way. Quite the contrary, estab-
lished norms and structures were, in fact, maintained 
and further codified.13 
Dissatisfaction over the cumbersome regional 
integration process led to an intra-Indonesia contro-
versy over the extent to which the country’s foreign 
policy should be pegged to ASEAN, ASEAN’s overall 
significance, and Jakarta’s future role in the organisa-
tion. Some observers described ASEAN as a golden cage 
for Indonesian foreign policy and called for an eman-
cipation from ASEAN.14 Demands for a post-ASEAN 
foreign policy, however, did not materialise into 
actual policy during the Yudhoyono administration. 
The administration did not disavow ASEAN as the 
cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy – even when 
the country started to display a more global orienta-
tion and increased activism on the global stage (e.g. 
through the establishment of the Bali Democracy 
Forum or its G 20-membership).15 Among other for-
 
12  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Indonesia’s Role as a Regional 
and Global Actor”, Wilton Park Annual Address (London, 2 Novem-
ber 2012), http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/president-yudhoyonos-
speech-at-our-annual-address/ (accessed 3 April 2015). 
13  Sebastian Bersick and Felix Heiduk, Im Krebsgang nach vorn: 
Die Asean hat sich eine Charta gegeben, SWP-Aktuell 65/2007 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2007). 
14  Jusuf Wanandi, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning 
of ASEAN”, PacNet 27, 15 May 2008, http://csis.org/files/media/ 
csis/pubs/pac0827.pdf; Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Needs a Post-
ASEAN Foreign Policy”, The Jakarta Post (online), 30 June 2009. 
15  “Statement by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Presi-
dent of the Republic of Indonesia, as the ASEAN Coordinator, at 
the Opening Ceremony of the Sixth ASEM Summit and Celebra-
tion of Ten Years of ASEM” (Helsinki, 10 September 2006), http:// 
www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/Speech TranscriptionDisplay.aspx? 
Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=266&l=en (accessed 
23 October 2014); “Remarks by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudho-
eign policy initiatives, Jakarta’s successful mediation 
during the Thai–Cambodian border conflict in 2011 
and its diplomatic initiatives in the wake of Cyclone 
Nargis, which led to an end of the blockade of humani-
tarian aid by Myanmar’s military junta, can be seen as 
evidence for Indonesia’s continued aspiration to act 
as a regional leader under the Yudhoyono administra-
tion.16 Moreover, against this backdrop of an evolving 
Sino–U.S. rivalry over hegemony in South-East Asia, 
ASEAN was increasingly ascribed a central position in 
Yudhoyono’s quest towards the creation of a “dynamic 
equilibrium”17 in the region.18 What is nonetheless 
striking is that the attribution of a regional leadership 
role to Indonesia is, by and large,19 based on the coun-
try’s policy initiatives in the fields of foreign policy 
and security and defence.20 Indonesian contributions 
to other policy fields, namely in the AEC and ASCC, 
have remained largely unconsidered. This study aims 
to close this apparent gap through a comparative 
policy analysis of six different policy fields. 
 
yono, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, before the 13th 
General Assembly of the Veterans Confederation of ASEAN Coun-
tries, State Palace” (Jakarta, 28 April 2010), http://www.kemlu. 
go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato& 
Name2=Presiden&IDP=642&l=en (accessed 23 October 2014); 
“Remarks by Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the Ceremony for the Transfer 
of Office of the Secretary-General of ASEAN” (Jakarta: ASEAN Sec-
retariat, 9 January 2013), http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/Speech 
TranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri& 
IDP=792&l=en (accessed 23 October 2014). 
16  Erlina Widyaningsih and Christopher B. Roberts, Indonesia in 
ASEAN: Mediation, Leadership and Extra-mural Diplomacy (Canberra: 
Australian National University, May 2014), http://nsc.anu.edu.au/ 
documents/Indonesia-Article13.pdf (accessed 24 September 2015). 
17  A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, Washington D.C.: Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, 27 September 2011, http://www.cfr.org/ 
indonesia/conversation-marty-natalegawa/p26047 (accessed 23 
October 2014). 
18  See Seng Tan, Indonesia among the Powers: Should ASEAN Still 
Matter to Indonesia? (Canberra: Australian National University, 
May 2014), http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/Indonesia-Article14. 
pdf (accessed 24 September 2015). 
19  Smith, Strategic Centrality (see note 8). 
20  Ralf Emmers, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: A Case of Incom-
plete and Sectorial Leadership”, The Pacific Review 27, no. 4 (2014): 
543–62; Donald E. Weatherbee, Indonesia in ASEAN. Vision and 
Reality (Singapore: ISEAS, 2014). 
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Indonesia in ASEAN 
 
Indonesia and the APSC: 
Conflict- and Crisis Management 
Statistics show that the ASEAN region has been rather 
successful in preventing inter-state conflicts from 
escalating into full-blown wars. Compared to the pre-
ASEAN period, casualty rates from armed conflicts 
have been reduced by 93 per cent, and no outright 
inter-state war has taken place since the founding of 
the organisation. This does not equate to a complete 
absence of inter-state armed conflicts in the region, 
but all of them have remained below the threshold 
of inter-state warfare. The recent Thai–Cambodian 
border conflict is a case in point. Hence, it is not 
ASEAN’s ability to resolve conflicts that best character-
ises the region’s “long peace”, but rather its ability to 
prevent them from escalating into full-blown wars.21 
Within this context, Indonesia has come to play a 
noteworthy role. 
Before the founding of ASEAN, a number of coun-
tries that would later become member states were 
involved in military conflicts with each other. Above 
all, it was the military conflict between Malaysia and 
Indonesia during the konfrontasi period between 1963 
and 1966 that had caught the attention of observers 
and policy-makers at the time. In many ways, ASEAN’s 
establishment was a reaction to Indonesia’s konfrontasi 
policy under Sukarno. Indonesia’s self-restraint and 
integration into ASEAN – and the pre-eminence of the 
principles of non-intervention and peaceful conflict 
resolution – brought a change in perceptions about 
Indonesia. The country went from being regarded as 
the leading cause of regional instability to being a 
“backbone” of the regional security architecture.22 
This view correlated with Indonesia playing a big part 
in the search for a diplomatic solution to the Cam-
bodian civil war at the end of the 1980s in the lead-up 
to the Paris peace conference.23 Aiding the change 
in perception was the widespread conviction among 
 
21  Timo Kivimäki, “Southeast Asia and Conflict Prevention. Is 
ASEAN Running out of Steam?”, The Pacific Review 25, no. 4 (2012): 
403–27 (409). 
22  Emmers, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN” (see note 20), 5. 
23  Amitav Acharya, Indonesia Matters. Asia’s Emerging Democratic 
Power (Singapore: World Scientific, 2014), 53. 
Indonesia’s political elites that ASEAN should be at 
the centre of South-East Asia’s regional security archi-
tecture in order to minimise the influence of external 
actors and to enable the development of regional, 
ASEAN-led solutions for regional security challenges. 
However, with the end of the Cold War – and the 
subsequent changes at the international and regional 
levels – the region was quickly facing new challenges. 
For one, ASEAN membership expanded due to the four 
Communist states of the south-east mainland joining 
the organisation. Moreover, many states in the region 
were confronted with a wide range of so-called new 
security threats, including terrorism, intra-state con-
flicts, and pandemics. Also, the perception of Indo-
nesia as the backbone of regional security was brought 
into question by a number of domestic issues, such as 
the difficult and cumbersome transition to democracy, 
an escalation of secessionist conflicts, and the terror 
attacks of the Islamist Jemaah Islamiyah network. As 
a result, Indonesia appeared instable, weak, and to 
some, even at the brink of disintegration.24 
Likewise, the rise of China and the associated Sino–
American competition over power and influence in 
South-East Asia put the regional security architecture 
to the test.25 Within the region, the ASEAN states 
responded by tightening intra-regional cooperation. 
Beyond South-East Asia, they were able to maintain 
ASEAN’s position at the centre of the regional security 
architecture by embedding the United States, China, 
and other external powers into ASEAN-led multilateral 
institutions. Most notably, these include the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus.26 
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Ideas on developing a security community for South-
East Asia materialised in the shape of the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community as part of the Bali Con-
cord II (2003). The APSC is supposed to form one of 
the three pillars of the ASEAN Community. Faced with 
growing levels of interdependence due to new trans-
national security challenges such as terrorism, the 
APSC is supposed to establish regional mechanisms for 
enhanced security cooperation and the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes. Additionally, the region’s further 
“political development” on the basis of “democracy 
and human rights, rule of law, and good governance” 
is to be promoted to strengthen stability and security. 
By joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, and through integration into multi-
lateral institutions closely linked to ASEAN (such as 
the ARF), external powers are to be socialised into 
ASEAN’s own norms and values. The Bali Concord II 
furthermore includes the objective of further devel-
oping a code of conduct for the South China Sea in 
order to peacefully manage the existing territorial 
conflicts between the ASEAN member states of Viet-
nam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, and 
China.27 
The APSC blueprint adopted in 2009, however, con-
tains very few concrete regional integration measures. 
Rather, it mainly consists of general declarations of 
intent. The signatories obligate themselves to resolve 
inter-state conflicts through peaceful means and with-
out the threat of force or the use of force.28 Such be-
havioural norms are to be developed and reinforced 
via confidence-building measures such as seminars, 
workshops, and regional meetings at regular intervals 
so that a “culture of peace” can prevail within the 
ASEAN. Furthermore, the usefulness of already estab-
lished conventions, that is, the Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Southeast Asian 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), is highlighted. 
What the APSC lacks are distinctive, new initiatives or 
approaches to further develop the established ASEAN 
approach. This approach focusses heavily on con-
flict prevention but holds little in terms of conflict 
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management and conflict resolution. Developing the 
latter is deemed to be a precondition for developing 
ASEAN into a real, functioning security community 
with the institutional capacities to peacefully manage 
– and ultimately resolve – inter-state conflicts. To be 
able to monitor, or even implement, ASEAN’s “culture 
of peace”, the relevant regional institutions would 
have to be strengthened. This, however, is not pro-
vided for in the APSC blueprint.29 As one observer 
aptly commented: “Nowhere […] is non-compliance 
with norms and rules dealt with, let alone conflict 
resolution. It is business as usual.”30 As a consequence, 
inter-state conflicts, such as the territorial disputes 
between the Philippines and Malaysia over Malaysia’s 
federal state of Sabah or the Thai–Cambodian border 
conflict, continue to linger. 
Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 
Historically, Indonesia has always played a prominent 
role in the establishment of a regional, ASEAN-led 
security architecture in the shape of ZOPFAN and 
SEANWFZ.31 This observation also holds true for the 
development of the APSC. The APSC was in large part 
conceptualised by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
during the time of Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship 
in 2003. Also, according to the Bali Concord II, Indo-
nesia was tasked with the preparation of a list of 
measures to be taken to establish the APSC.32 This list 
was presented in 2004 and contained dozens of items, 
including the establishment of an ASEAN peacekeep-
ing force, a regional counter-terrorism centre, and the 
“ASEANization” of military-to-military cooperation 
between the member states. All of this was aimed at 
furthering and strengthening the regional institu-
tional capacities in the field of conflict management. 
Indonesia also pushed for a gradual loosening of the 
non-intervention principle, especially in cases where 
domestic security concerns of one state have destabi-
lising effects on neighbouring states. Until then, the 
non-intervention principle had been considered to be 
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sacrosanct. Other member states, however, strongly 
resisted these plans (above all, Vietnam and Singa-
pore), eventually foiling Indonesia’s initiative. The 
same must be said for Indonesia’s attempts to estab-
lish a regional mechanism for human rights protec-
tion at the regional level and Indonesia’s idea of a 
regionally binding non-aggression pact. 
Nonetheless, some of Indonesia’s initiatives proved 
to be successful. Indonesia was behind much of the 
wording of the ASEAN Charter 2007 and successfully 
established normative concepts such as a normative 
commitment to democracy and human rights within 
the charter. At the same time, however, long-held 
ASEAN principles such as non-intervention and con-
sensual decision-making prevailed, and a stronger 
institutionalisation of ASEAN for the most part failed 
due to the resistance of other member states. Indo-
nesia also masterminded the establishment of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights in 2009 and the ASEAN Human Rights Declara-
tion of 2012. Yet again, both were essentially signifi-
cantly watered down versions of the original concepts 
developed by Indonesia due to the resistance of other 
member states, who feared that a stronger institu-
tionalisation of ASEAN would essentially compromise 
their own national sovereignty.33 
Indonesia’s Perception and Position 
Jakarta’s ambition to act as the “intellectual”34 leader 
for regional conflict management is based on the 
widely shared conviction among Indonesian leaders 
that the maintenance of regional stability and security 
and the peaceful management of disputes is to be at 
the centre of Indonesian foreign policy. This is because 
regional security and stability are seen as precondi-
tions for national development and prosperity.35 Tied 
to these convictions is an expressed preference for an 
ASEAN-led regional security architecture that is – to 
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the greatest possible extent – independent from the 
influence of external powers over a security architec-
ture based on bilateral military alliances with external 
powers. Under the Yudhoyono administration, the 
Indonesian preference for an ASEAN-centred regional 
security architecture was closely tied to the concept of 
a “dynamic equilibrium” for South-East Asia. Accord-
ingly, any hegemony of an external power is to be 
avoided.36 The Indonesian preference differs starkly 
from those of other ASEAN member states such as 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, all of which 
have closely linked their national security policies to 
military alliances with the United States. In Jakarta’s 
view, it is ASEAN that should form the linchpin of the 
regional security architecture.37 Derived from there, 
ASEAN must sit in the driver’s seat in other regional 
forums such as the ARF and EAS, too.38 
Moreover, it is a widely shared assumption in 
Jakarta that if ASEAN is to retain its functionality 
in the face of newly emerging security challenges, 
regional integration in the field of security and de-
fence needs to be deepened. The fact that Indonesian 
initiatives for a deepening of regional integration 
measures have often not failed to materialise has 
sparked a debate within the country over the possi-
bility of reforming and further developing ASEAN and 
– taking that into consideration – whether ASEAN 
should actually continue to form the cornerstone of 
Indonesian foreign policy.39 Critics have argued that 
ASEAN principles such as consensual decision-making 
and norm-intervention have greatly hampered the 
organisation’s ability to play an enhanced role in con-
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flict management with regard to the Thai–Cambodian 
border dispute or the South China Sea conflict.40 
Implementation in Indonesia 
So far, Jakarta has often been unable to have its ideas 
on developing ASEAN into a more integrated, more 
effective security community accepted within ASEAN. 
One example of this is the resistance to the Indonesian 
idea of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. Even so, Jakarta 
has unilaterally implemented a number of measures 
in the field of conflict prevention and conflict manage-
ment. Jakarta acted as mediator when the Thai–Cam-
bodian border conflict, which had been simmering for 
a long time, escalated into a number of armed skir-
mishes around the Preah Vihear temple in February 
2011. Equipped with a UN Security Council mandate, 
Indonesia, which held the ASEAN chairmanship at the 
time, called for an emergency meeting of the ASEAN 
foreign ministers. The meeting produced a ceasefire 
agreement and a demilitarisation of the disputed ter-
ritory, both of which were mediated and respectively 
monitored by Indonesia.41 
In addition, when the ASEAN summit of July 2012 
failed to produce a joint communiqué for the first 
time in the history of the organisation, it was Indo-
nesia again that played a crucial role in attempts to 
repair the damage through active diplomacy. The 
failed communiqué was the refusal of the Cambodian 
government to include in the communiqué what it 
perceived as overtly China-critical positions of Viet-
nam and the Philippines on their territorial disputes 
with China in the South China Sea. As a result, then-
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa embarked for 
consultations with all the involved parties. Natalega-
wa’s shuttle diplomacy proved to be successful insofar 
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as it produced ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South 
China Sea.42 
Furthermore, Indonesia was actively involved in 
the peace talks between the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF), fighting for independence for the Mus-
lim-majority south of the Philippines, and the central 
government in Manila. The armed confrontation 
between the MNLF and Manila formally ended in 2010 
with the signing of a memorandum of understanding 
brokered by Jakarta.43 Jakarta was also instrumental in 
establishing the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Recon-
ciliation (AIPR), with the purpose of advancing peace-
ful approaches for the resolution of intra- and inter-
state conflicts.44 At the same time, the aforementioned 
attempts to institutionalise the APSC illustrate 
the limits of Indonesian leadership. Contrary to the 
demands of Indonesia, the AIPR is merely based at a 
Track II level, possesses no independent monitoring 
competencies vis-à-vis the ASEAN member states, 
and, with regard to its budget, essentially relies on 
voluntary contributions.45 
Indonesia in the APSC: Counter-Terrorism 
Despite the fact that a number of South-East Asian 
states have been experiencing terrorist attacks for 
many years, it was not until the Bali bombings in 2002 
that regional counter-terrorism policies made it onto 
the ASEAN agenda. This was mainly because, for the 
individual member states experiencing terrorist chal-
lenges, it was a problem that they primarily ascribed 
to the local and national levels. Hence, up until the 
Bali bombings, a joint ASEAN position – or even an 
ASEAN strategy – on the issue of terrorism did not 
exist.46 Perceptions in the region did not change until 
the investigations that took place after the attacks on 
two nightclubs on Bali – as well as investigations fol-
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lowing subsequent attacks (such as the attack on a 
passenger ferry in Manila Bay as well as the Marriot 
Hotel and Australian embassy attacks in Jakarta), 
brought to light the existing transnational linkages 
between militant Islamists in Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, and Malaysia.47 As a consequence, a 
number of ASEAN member states enacted anti-terror 
legislation and implemented counter-terrorism meas-
ures, with counter-terrorism becoming a high priority 
on the ASEAN agenda during the Bali Concord II in 
2003. 
The developments in the field of counter-terrorism 
policies in South-East Asia after the Bali Concord II, 
however, also showcase the differences between the 
member states in terms of their perceptions of – and 
their reactions to – so-called new, transnational ter-
rorist threats. Whereas almost all states of maritime 
South-East Asia plus Thailand had been directly 
affected by terrorism, the threat perception levels, as 
well as the pressure to react, differed markedly with 
regard to Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 
which had not experienced any direct threats from 
armed terrorist groups. Moreover, public discourse in 
the majority-Muslim countries of Malaysia and Indo-
nesia was heavily influenced by narratives that equated 
the US-led global “war on terror” with a hidden “war 
against Islam”. Owing to prevailing perceptions of a 
hidden “war against Islam”, and subsequent domestic 
resistance to counter-terrorism policies, the room for 
political manoeuvre in the field was at first signifi-
cantly narrowed down for the respective governments. 
Former Indonesian Defence Minister Sofjan Djalil 
referred to the “sensitive” social context that his coun-
try had to consider when launching a new counter-
terrorism strategy.48 Governments in Singapore, Thai-
land, and the Philippines, on the other hand, faced 
considerably less domestic resistance.49 
 
47  Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Crucible of Terror 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
48  Matori Abdul Djalil, “Managing Terrorism: An Indonesian 
Perspective”, The Jakarta Post (online), 4 June 2002, http:// 
yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/managing-terrorism-indonesian-
perspective (accessed 12 December 2014). 
49  Senia Febrica, “Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indo-
nesia”, Asian Survey 50, no. 3 (2010): 569–90. 
Regional Agreements 
Until the Bali bombings in 2002, the issue of trans-
national terrorism was dealt with regionally as merely 
being one aspect of transnational organised crime. In 
1997 the ASEAN member states had signed the ASEAN 
Declaration on Transnational Crime, also known as 
the Manila Declaration, followed by an action plan 
(ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime) 
a year later. This was followed by the establishment 
of regional dialogue forums at the ministerial level 
(ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime) 
and at the level of high-ranking officials (ASEAN Senior 
Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime).50 Neither 
the Manila Declaration nor the action plan or the com-
muniqués of the dialogue forums were legally binding. 
All of them were mere declarations of intent that 
stressed the need for a “closer regional cooperation 
of intelligence services” and a “harmonization of 
national legislation”. 
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, how-
ever, changed the regional political dynamics. The 
ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terror-
ism was issued on 5 November 2001, in which ter-
rorism was labelled the main threat for stability and 
economic development in the region. The declaration 
also called on the member states to improve the capac-
ities of their own security forces in the field of counter-
terrorism.51 The declaration furthermore called for 
the formulation of a legally binding counter-terrorism 
convention. All other measures directed at increased 
regional cooperation and harmonisation at the opera-
tional level fell through because of opposition from 
the mainland South-East Asian states, who perceived 
themselves as being only marginally affected by trans-
national terrorism and were hesitant to allow any real 
or perceived compromises of their national sovereign-
ty. At the same time, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines pushed for more comprehensive regional 
cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. With a 
comprehensive regional agreement beyond reach for 
the time being, what followed were a number of bi- 
and trilateral agreements. One example is the agree-
ment on intelligence exchanges at the sub-regional 
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level signed by Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines in 2002.52 
Despite the continuing differences in threat percep-
tions, domestic politics, and strategic interests, two 
important agreements were completed at the regional 
level in the years that followed the Bali bombings. In 
2004, the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Crimi-
nal Matters (MLA) set out the basic principles for legal 
assistance between ASEAN member states. The MLA 
was ratified by Indonesia in 2008. More importantly, 
2007 saw the signing of the ASEAN Convention on 
Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), which was ratified by In-
donesia in 2012. Through the ACCT, a joint definition 
of terrorism was established. The signatories commit-
ted themselves to share information and data with 
other national intelligence services, freeze bank assets 
of terrorist groups to inhibit terrorist financing, en-
hance cooperation during investigations, and cooper-
ate in the extradition of terror suspects. 
Admittedly, critics have noted that the ACCT, for 
the most part, simply mirrors already-existing UN 
conventions. They also noted that the strict interpreta-
tion of national sovereignty laid out in Articles III to V 
allows all signatories to label any terrorist threat with 
transnational dimensions a national security affair, 
thereby removing it from the scope of application of 
the ACCT.53 Because of that, the ACCT – by upholding 
the principles of non-intervention and absolute na-
tional sovereignty – is in accordance with the ASEAN 
Way. In return, a legally binding ASEAN Extradition 
Treaty – deemed indispensable for effective regional 
counter-terrorism policies – has yet to move past the 
drafting phase. 
Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 
Despite initial reluctance, which was to a large extent 
due to domestic pressures and sensitivities, Indonesia, 
together with Malaysia and the Philippines, has come 
to set the regional agenda since 2002. The counter-
terrorism agreement that the three states signed in 
2002 built on an Indonesian initiative. The same can 
be said for the draft of the regional counter-terrorism 
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convention.54 And although the ACCT is largely con-
gruent with previously established UN conventions, 
it does set itself apart from similar regional and inter-
national agreements through Article 11. Article 11 
includes guidelines for the rehabilitation and reinte-
gration of former terrorists by involving religious and 
civil society organisations. Article 11 was primarily 
shaped by Indonesia’s political preferences and experi-
ences in the field of de-radicalisation.55 It shows how 
Indonesia was successful in embedding its own “soft 
power approach”56 on the regional level – through 
which it has sought to emphasise the need for de-radi-
calisation and rehabilitation – and at the same time 
disassociate itself and ASEAN from the militarisation 
of counter-terrorism policies generated in Washing-
ton.57 
Indonesia’s Perception and Position 
Consideration of Indonesia’s active engagement in 
multilateral counter-terrorism forums is closely linked 
to the change in threat perception in the country 
since 2002. Up until the Bali bombings of 2002, large 
parts of Indonesian society, as well as large parts of 
the political elite, had not come to terms with the oc-
currence of militant Islamist groups within the coun-
try. The domestic political conundrum was further 
elevated by the US-led “global war on terror”, which 
was perceived as a hidden “war against Islam”, and 
thus was met with strong domestic opposition. The 
Bali bombings in 2002, however, forced Jakarta to 
recognise the occurrence of – and dangers associated 
with – Jemaah Islamiyah (“Islamic Community”) and 
other militant Islamist groups inside of Indonesia. 
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This change in perception triggered a change of 
course in the country’s counter-terrorism policy.58 
Shortly after the terror attacks on Bali, national 
legislation was changed fundamentally. A special 
counter-terrorism police unit was founded and several 
dozen terror suspects were arrested. At the same time, 
Jakarta went to great lengths to publicly distance itself 
from the militarised US approach to counter-terrorism 
because of strong domestic opposition.59 For example, 
Jakarta continuously emphasised the importance 
of moderate Islamic civil society organisations in the 
fight against terrorism.60 Indonesia’s approach to 
counter-terrorism, as such, rests on two pillars: On the 
one hand, there is the prosecution of terrorists, which 
is to be conducted in line with the rule of law and 
democracy; on the other hand, there is the “soft power 
approach”, which aims for the de-radicalisation and 
rehabilitation of terrorists and seeks close cooperation 
between religious authorities, civil society, and state 
institutions (police, prisons, and judiciary). It is through 
the latter by which Indonesia’s approach – normatively 
and in practice – differs markedly from those of the 
United States and some of its neighbours. Especially 
Singapore and Malaysia have, in the aftermath of 9/11, 
launched draconian counter-terrorism laws.61 
In addition, because of the existing networks forged 
between Jemaah Islamiyah and other militant groups 
such as Abu Sayaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front in the southern Philippines, a regional approach 
to counter-terrorism has become a sine qua non. From 
Jakarta’s view, especially transnational security threats 
such as terrorism underline the indispensability of 
closer regional cooperation for maintaining stability 
and security in the region.62 Former Foreign Minister 
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the Asia-Pacific’” (see note 26). 
Natalegawa, for example, repeatedly stressed the need 
for closer regional cooperation under the ACCT.63 
Implementation in Indonesia 
In line with this, Indonesia has enacted various legis-
lation on the national level that permutes key elements 
of ASEAN’s regional approach to counter-terrorism.64 
For example, a new national counter-terrorism agency, 
the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) 
was created in 2010, which is to devote itself specifi-
cally to prevention and de-radicalisation, was created 
in 2010. Indonesia has also ratified the ACCT as well 
as the MLA. Jakarta has furthermore pushed for a re-
gional extradition treaty (ASEAN Extradition Treaty),65 
although it has been unsuccessful due to strong oppo-
sition from Singapore, among others. At the opera-
tional level, Indonesia has hosted numerous regional 
conferences, workshops, and trainings on themes and 
issues closely linked to counter-terrorism, and it is also 
host to the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Co-
operation (JCLEC). JCLEC was founded with the exten-
sive support of international donors and offers ad-
vanced trainings courses for police officers from the 
Asia-Pacific region on a wide range of issues: from 
countering money laundering to de-radicalisation, 
forensics, and the latest investigation techniques. 
Indonesia is furthermore actively involved in inter-
national forums such as the ARF and the Global 
Counter-Terrorism Forum. In the latter forum, it is 
Indonesia, together with Australia, that is chairing 
the South-East Asia working group. Indonesia has 
also ratified a number of important international 
conventions for global counter-terrorism policies.66 
 
63  Margareth S. Aritonang, “Indonesia Set to Ratify ASEAN Anti-
Terror Pact”, The Jakarta Post (online), 9 March 2012, http://www. 
thejakartapost.com/news/2012/03/09/indonesia-set-ratify-asean-
anti-terror-pact.html (accessed 13 December 2014). 
64  This includes, among other things, the Anti-Terrorism Law 
No. 15/2003, the Anti-Money Laundering Law No. 8/2010, and 
the Prevention and the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Law 
No. 9/2013. 
65  “Indonesia Pushes ASEAN Extradition Agreement”, The Manila 
Standard, 23 January 2003; Ciara Spencer, “Reflections on the 
Effectiveness of Extradition in the ASEAN Region”, in Cross-Border 
Law Enforcement. Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation – European, 
Australian and Asia-Pacific Perspectives, ed. Saskia Hufnagel, Clive 
Harfield and Simon Bronitt (London: Routledge, 2012), 143–62. 
66  Irman Moad, “ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Cooperation”, Asian 
Defence Journal (April 2013): 6–8. 
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Hence the claim that Indonesia has taken on a 
leading role in regional counter-terrorism policies 
since 2002 appears justifiable. One of the main 
reasons for this appears to be the fact that Indonesia 
has been hit hardest by terror attacks in the region. 
Indonesia’s activism on the regional level following 
the Bali bombings of 2002 has been viewed by some 
observers as a more general indicator of an Indonesian 
“re-engagement” in ASEAN after years in which the 
nation – because of domestic instabilities following 
the transition from authoritarianism to democracy – 
had arguably punched below its weight on the regional 
level.67 At the same time, the case of Indonesia’s role 
in regional counter-terrorism policies illustrates the 
limits of Indonesia’s leadership claim in ASEAN. These 
limits were made apparent not least by resistance 
from Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore towards mak-
ing ASEAN’s non-intervention principle gradually 
more flexible – it had been put forward by Jakarta 
with regard to the extradition of terror suspects in the 
context of closer regional counter-terrorism coopera-
tion.68 It furthermore remains to be seen whether the 
apparent fragmentation of militant Islamist networks 
in Indonesia, as well as recent strategic and opera-
tional adjustments undertaken by militant groups,69 
will lead to a re-adjustment of regional approaches 
to counter-terrorism in the future.70 
Indonesia in the AEC: 
The ASEAN Single Aviation Market 
Besides aiming for the free movement of goods, the 
2003 Bali Concord II also seeks to liberalise the service 
sector to the greatest extent possible. A key part of 
the latter is the establishment of the ASEAN Single 
Aviation Market (ASAM). ASAM’s main purpose is to 
provide South-East Asia’s airlines, which have experi-
enced tremendous growth rates in the last few years, 
 
67  Emmers, “Comprehensive Security and Resilience in South-
east Asia” (see note 55), 172. 
68  Weatherbee, Indonesia in ASEAN (see note 20), 64. 
69  These changes have manifested themselves, for example, in 
terms of the targets chosen by militant groups, as attackers have 
shifted their focus from Western targets to state security forces 
and government officials. See: International Crisis Group, ed., 
How Indonesian Extremists Regroup, (Jakarta and Brussels, 16 July 
2012), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-
asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup.aspx 
(accessed 7 January 2015). 
70  Interview with a journalist from the Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 
30 March 2015. 
with access to new markets and flight routes. Hereby, 
great importance has been attached to Indonesia as 
being not only the most populous country of the region 
with a growing middle class, but also a country that 
possesses nearly three dozen international airports. 
Because of the geographic conditions in the region, 
especially with regard to the archipelagic nations of 
maritime South-East Asia, air travel has evolved as a 
central mode of transport. Indonesia, for example, 
consists of more than 10,000 islands, has numerous 
remote mountainous regions, and its highways and 
train tracks are chronically underdeveloped. The 
region-wide growth of a middle class that is increas-
ingly able to afford to travel by plane has led to a 
steady increase in the number of passengers as well 
as airlines. Until very recently, however, all access to 
airports in the region was exclusively regulated via 
bilateral agreements between respective ASEAN 
member states. The agreements regulated passenger 
volumes, the numbers of arrivals and departures, as 
well as safety standards. With few exceptions, member 
states hereby generally attempted to protect national 
airlines by restricting market access through strict 
quotas for passenger numbers and the number of 
arrivals and departures granted to foreign airlines.71 
Regional Agreements 
Ideas for a single aviation market date back to 2002, 
when a memorandum on air freight services (ASEAN 
Memorandum of Understanding on Air Freight Ser-
vices) was signed. The memorandum only included 
cargo planes with a capacity of up to 100 tons; it has 
since been upgraded to include cargo planes of up to 
250 tons (in 2007). The services of passenger planes, 
however, were to be liberalised ASEAN-wide by 2015, 
according to the 2003 Bali Concord II. Although dis-
cussions revolving around ASAM made frequent refer-
ence to the EU’s Open Skies policy, the extent to which 
South-East Asian nations aimed to liberalise their skies 
by the end of 2015 was comparatively modest.72 At its 
heart, ASAM is limited to the third, fourth, and fifths 
freedoms of the air. This means that airlines from one 
state may be granted the right to put down passengers 
 
71  ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (Jakarta, January 
2008), http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf. 
72  ASEAN, Declaration on the Adoption of the Implementation Frame-
work of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market (Phnom Penh, 15 Decem-
ber 2011), http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/111219-17th 
%20ATM_Agenda%20Item%208%20Declaration-ASAM.pdf. 
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in another state (third freedom), take on passengers 
destined for the home state into another state (fourth 
freedom), and for airlines embarking in their home 
state to put down – and subsequently take on – pas-
sengers in another state with the destination of a 
third state.73 A further liberalisation of air traffic, as 
laid down in EU law, would also enable the transport 
of cargo and/or passengers in the region without 
including the home state of the airline in the routing 
as well as enable airlines to transport cargo or passen-
gers on domestic routes within a third state (“cabo-
tage”). 
The proposed Open Skies ASEAN project rests on 
three separate regional agreements. The Multilateral 
Agreement on Air Services (MAAS), struck in 2009, 
provided for a liberalisation of passenger transport 
regulations between ASEAN’s capital cities from 2010 
onwards. The Multilateral Agreement on the Full 
Liberalization of Air Freight Services (MAFLAFS), struck 
in 2009, also opened up cargo traffic at all inter-
national airports in the region for competition between 
airlines from different ASEAN member countries. One 
year later saw the signing of the Multilateral Agree-
ment on the Full Liberalization of Passenger Air Ser-
vices (MAFLPAS), which made attempts to further 
liberalise passenger traffic ASEAN-wide by including 
all non-international airports as well. However, seeing 
that all three agreements are non-binding by nature, 
their implementation has hinged exclusively on the 
political will of the respective member states. 
Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 
Specifically Singapore and Malaysia showed the politi-
cal will to push for the implementation of Open Skies 
against the background of expanding national air-
lines. Yet, such attempts were met by resistance from 
other member states, most notably in the Philippines, 
and especially in Indonesia. Given the non-binding 
nature of the regional agreements and the reluctance 
of some member states to implement them, Singapore 
and Malaysia first began to liberalise air traffic on a 
bilateral level. This produced a number of sub-regional 
agreements, with Singapore serving as the driving 
force at the helm, such as the 2004 Open Skies agree-
 
73  For a short overview on the freedoms of the air, please see: 
International Civil Aviation Organization, Freedoms of the Air, 
http://www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx (accessed 24 Sep-
tember 2015). 
ment between Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand. 
Besides this, both states made continuous attempts 
to have the further liberalisation of air traffic put 
onto the regional agenda. 
Indonesia’s Perception and Position 
Such attempts have largely proven to be futile due 
to the resistance of Indonesia – the country with the 
largest potential air traffic market in the region – 
towards any further liberalisation. This was mainly 
because many in Indonesia, including the director 
general of air transportation at the Ministry of Trans-
portation, Herry Bakti Singayuda Gumay, perceived 
the calls by Singapore and others for the full liberali-
sation of air traffic to be against Indonesia’s national 
interests.74 Indonesia’s obstinance of any further liber-
alisation – and the protectionist attitudes it displays 
regarding ASAM – are, on the one hand, based on the 
assumption that the expanding low-price airlines in 
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia would effectively 
push Indonesian airlines out of lucrative domestic 
routes and markets. These included especially the 
much sought-after routes between the capital cities of 
Bangkok and Jakarta as well as Singapore and Jakarta. 
This view has been eschewed by the secretary general 
of the Indonesian National Air Carrier Association, 
Tengku Burhanuddin, who argued that any liberalisa-
tion processes going beyond the already established 
gradual opening of domestic markets would directly 
harm Indonesian airlines because “foreign airlines 
will be transporting our passengers to Europe, whereas 
we want to do that ourselves”.75 
On the other hand, it has been a long-held view 
in Indonesia that it would effectively be the smaller 
ASEAN member states such as Singapore and Brunei – 
each of them only possessing one international airport 
and no domestic air traffic at all – that would benefit 
disproportionally from liberalisation processes. In In-
donesia’s view, truly open skies would enable various 
Singaporean airlines to get direct market access to 
more than two dozen international airports in Indo-
nesia, whereas Indonesian airlines, in return, would 
merely be able to head for Singapore’s lone airport, 
 
74  “Indonesia Rejects Singapore’s Call for Aviation Liberaliza-
tion”, Asia Pulse, 8 October 2010. 
75  “Govt Readies Airports for ASEAN Open Sky”, The Jakarta Post 
(online), 16 January 2010, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 
2010/01/16/govt-readies-airports-asean-open-sky.html (accessed 
8 February 2015). 
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Changi. As a result, Indonesia – despite possessing the 
largest airspace and market for air traffic in the region 
with the biggest growth potential for the future – 
would be among the losers in the race for South-East 
Asia’s Open Skies.76 
Furthermore, Indonesian airline representatives 
such as Emirsyah Satar, director general of Indonesia’s 
state-owned airline, Garuda Indonesia, complained 
about the lack of a level playing field in the region 
when it comes to Open Skies. According to Satar, other 
ASEAN member states would deliberately close off 
market access for Indonesian airlines by putting up 
technical barriers such as different safety regulations 
or by artificially reducing the number of open slots 
for arrivals and departures to other regional airlines.77 
Because of their lower safety standards, Indonesian 
airlines have gained a bad reputation in the region 
and would therefore lose out in direct competition 
with other regional airlines in the event of full liber-
alisation.78 
Hence, any protectionist measures that might 
circumvent the spirit of regional agreements are, 
according to a representative from the Transport 
Ministry, solely implemented in order to protect 
Indonesian airlines from drawing the short straw.79 
This view is also shared by representatives of the pri-
vate sector, who have argued against further liberali-
sation on the assumption that the expected positive 
effects of full liberalisation would be unequally dis-
tributed within the region. It is widely assumed that 
Indonesia would be among those countries carrying 
the burden, economically speaking, rather than reap-
ing the benefits of truly open skies in South-East Asia.80 
 
76  Interview with an Indonesian airline consultant, Jakarta, 
31 March 2015. 
77  “Skies Open: OBG Talks to Emirsyah Satar, CEO, Garuda 
Indonesia”, in The Report: Indonesia 2014, Oxford Business Group 
(London, 2014), 267f., http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/ 
interview/skies-open-obg-talks-emirsyah-satar-ceo-garuda-
indonesia (accessed 3 December 2014). 
78  Batari Saraswati and Shinya Hanaoka, “Aviation Policy in 
Indonesia and Its Relation to ASEAN Single Aviation Market”, 
Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies 9, 
no. 3 (2013): 7. 
79  “Government to Restrict ASEAN Open Sky Policy on Five Air-
ports”, Tempo, 9 April 2010, http://tempo.co.id/hg/ekbis/2010/04/ 
09/brk,20100409-239305,uk.html (accessed 6 June 2015). 
80  Interview with an Indonesian airline consultant, Jakarta, 31 
March 2015; “Taking Off: OBG Talks to Emirsyah Satar, President 
& CEO, Garuda Indonesia”, in The Report: Indonesia 2013, Oxford 
Business Group (London, 2013), 237, http://www.oxfordbusiness 
group.com/interview/taking-obg-talks-emirsyah-satar-president-
ceo-garuda-indonesia (accessed 3 December 2014). 
Implementation in Indonesia 
In light of that, Indonesia’s primary policy preference 
is to protect its national airlines against competitors 
from other ASEAN member states.81 This policy pref-
erence has found its way into national legislation: 
Article 94 of Indonesia’s law on aviation makes it very 
clear that liberalisation of air traffic is to be limited 
to the third, fourth, and fifth freedoms of the air and 
forbids any further liberalisation of the domestic mar-
ket.82 With this in mind, it was not until late 2014 
that Indonesia become the last ASEAN member state 
to ratify the MAAS agreement on the liberalisation of 
passenger transport regulations. Indonesia, however, 
has yet to ratify the MAFLAFS agreement on the liber-
alisation of cargo transport regulations.83 After exten-
sive negotiations at the regional level, Indonesia 
declared that it would only partially implement the 
further liberalisation measures of passenger transport 
provided for in the MAFLPAS agreement by the end 
of 2015.84 Accordingly, Indonesia is to grant access to 
airlines that are based in other ASEAN member states 
to only 5 of its 29 international airports. Besides 
Jakarta’s international airport, to which access has 
been granted already – in line with the MAAS agree-
ment – this includes the airports of Medan, Denpasar, 
Surabaya, and Makassar. Market access to other inter-
national airports and the respective flight routes will 
only be made possible through bilateral agreements. 
In addition to this, Indonesia has recently tightened 
the safety regulations for foreign airlines and limited 
the number of available slots for foreign airlines at a 
number of its international airports. Whereas the allo-
cation of such slots is handled in most other ASEAN 
member states (with the exception of the Philippines) 
by an independent institution, the formally independ-
 
81  “Discourse: RI’s Aviation Growth to Skyrocket”, The Jakarta 
Post (online), 27 May 2013, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 
2013/05/27/discourse-ri-s-aviation-growth-skyrocket.html (accessed 
6 June 2015). 
82  For an (unofficial) translation, see: The Republic of Indonesia’s 
Law, Number 1, Year 2009, on Aviation, http://www.vertic.org/media/ 
National%20Legislation/Indonesia/ID_Aviation%20Act.pdf. 
83  “AirAsia, MAHB to Benefit from Indonesia Ratification of 
ASEAN Open Skies Pact”, The Star, 24 September 2014, http:// 
www.thestar.com.my/Business/Business-News/2014/09/24/AirAsia-
MAHB-expected-to-benefit-from-Indonesia-ratification/ (accessed 
8 February 2015). 
84  Tan, Indonesia among the Powers (see note 18). 
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ent Indonesia Slot Coordinator is headed by an official 
from state-owned Garuda Indonesia airline.85 
Indonesia’s reluctance regarding any further liber-
alisation of air traffic is furthermore closely linked 
with the current state of the isnfrastructure of the 
nation’s big airports. Airports such as Surabaya, Den-
pasar, and especially Jakarta have been operating 
beyond the capacities they were initially designed 
to cope with for many years. For example, Jakarta’s 
Soekarno-Hatta airport was planned and built to 
handle an annual volume of up to 22 million passen-
gers. Its passenger volume for the year 2013 exceeded 
60 million.86 New terminals and a new airport are in 
planning, but their completion dates are still pending. 
It is against this background that Indonesia has 
decided to ignore some of the regulations stipulated 
in the three agreements that make up ASEAN’s Open 
Skies. Circumventing many of the overarching goals 
of ASEAN Open Skies, Jakarta has only opened a small 
number of its airports and flight routes to competitors 
from other ASEAN member states. In line with this, 
ASEAN’s own AEC scorecard for the transport sector 
illustrates that Indonesia has achieved fewer than half 
of the regional integration processes that are to be 
implemented by the end of 2015.87 The main impetus 
for the further liberalisation and integration of South-
East Asia’s air traffic has come from Singapore, and to 
a lesser extent Malaysia, Brunei, and Thailand. Indo-
nesia has mainly acted as a procrastinator, which on 
the one hand is based on fears that a fully integrated 
regional aviation sector would result in the domestic 
market being swamped by better-positioned, highly 
competitive airlines from other ASEAN member states. 
This, in turn, would result in Indonesian airlines fall-
ing behind. On the other hand, it is based on the ob-
servation that any further liberalisation would create 
gridlock at Indonesia’s airports, or even lead to the 
collapse of air traffic, due to inadequate, underdevel-
oped infrastructure. As a result of Indonesia’s open 
resistance to ASEAN’s Open Skies, any implementation 
of the envisioned further integration processes ap-
pears to be unrealistic for the time being. 
 
85  Saraswati and Hanaoka, “Aviation Policy in Indonesia and Its 
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86  The Port Authority of NY & NJ, ed., Airport Traffic Report (New 
York, April 2014), 35, http://www.panynj.gov/airports/pdf-traffic/ 
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87  ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard (Jakarta, March 
2012), 23, http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/10132.pdf. 
Indonesia in the AEC: Labour Mobility 
Freedom of labour movement is, next to freedom of 
services, one of the key areas of the AEC. Labour mobil-
ity is to be expanded as part of ASEAN’s regional inte-
gration processes to match the increasing demand in 
the region for skilled, highly qualified workers. This 
notwithstanding, current ASEAN regulations to in-
crease labour mobility exclude an estimated 90 per 
cent of all migrant labourers. The overwhelming 
majority of migrant labourers emanate from the low-
skill sector (e.g. construction workers, farm workers), 
whereas existing regional agreements and correspond-
ing regional integration processes in the field only 
cover a number of highly-skilled occupational groups 
(e.g. doctors). These highly-skilled migrant labourers, 
however, are only an extremely small portion of the 
overall number of migrant labourers in South-East 
Asia.88 Another regional characteristic is the strong 
discrepancy between countries of origin and recipient 
countries. An estimated 97 per cent of all migrant 
labourers migrate to only three countries: Thailand 
(3.5 million), Malaysia (1.5 million), and Singapore 
(1 million). More than half of them originate from the 
Philippines (34 per cent) and Indonesia (20 per cent). 
These stark discrepancies are also visible with regard 
to demographic developments within ASEAN: Whereas 
population growth in Singapore and Malaysia has for 
the last years been below 0.5 per cent per year, Indo-
nesia’s population is growing at a rate of 3 per cent 
and more per year. Similar discrepancies are detect-
able with regards to living standards and median 
income levels in the region.89 
Regional Agreements 
The overarching objective behind the existing ASEAN 
agreements on labour mobility has been to better 
facilitate the migration of high-skilled labour from 
one ASEAN member state to another. Various instru-
ments have been employed to achieve this goal: 
through the easing and harmonisation of granting 
work permits and residency permits for highly quali-
fied migrant labourers; and through an ASEAN-wide 
 
88  Jayant Menon, “Narrowing the Development Divide in 
ASEAN: The Role of Policy”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 27, 
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89  Guntur Sugiyarto, “Internal and International Migration in 
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Indonesia in the AEC: Labour Mobility 
SWP Berlin 






recognition of trainings and qualifications in a num-
ber of specified occupation groups.90 
For example, the AEC blueprint proposes a disman-
tling of all substantial constraints to providers of ser-
vices. They shall be given permission to act ASEAN-
wide and to establish businesses in other ASEAN mem-
ber states, too.91 With regards to regional integration 
measures, such policy objectives primarily contain a 
political-administrative dimension: Member states 
must provide respective visa and work permits and 
need to liberalise their legislation regarding foreign 
direct investments from other ASEAN member states. 
To this end, ASEAN member states signed two agree-
ments in 2012. First, the ASEAN Agreement on the 
Movement of Natural Persons provides the legal frame-
work for temporary labour migration within ASEAN. 
According to its regulations, visa procedures for busi-
ness travellers, service providers, and the transfer of 
company employees from one member state to an-
other are to be harmonised. The second is the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which 
concerns investors, managers, and company execu-
tives. It lays out simplified and harmonised proce-
dures for temporary work and residency permits for 
cases in which the aforementioned persons “have 
committed or are in the process of committing a sub-
stantial amount of capital or other resources” in the 
territory of another member state.92 
Closer examination of both agreements makes it 
clear that the chief objective hereby is “freer” – but 
not “free” – migration of labour in the region.93 More-
over, the agreements do not regulate individual at-
tempts by citizens of ASEAN member states to obtain 
work or residency permits in another member state. 
The ACIA, in particular, aims to facilitate the tem-
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92  The agreement is accessible under the following URL: http:// 
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ASEAN (see note 90), 3. 
porary transfer of labour from a company’s head office 
to a branch office or a subsidiary in another ASEAN 
country. Furthermore, ASEAN member states have 
agreed upon the ASEAN-wide recognition of specific 
qualifications and sets of skills. To this end, all mem-
ber states have entered Mutual Recognition Agree-
ments (MRAs). MRAs currently exist for six occupa-
tional groups: engineers, architects, doctors, dentists, 
nurses, and tourism professionals. MRAs for a number 
of other occupational groups, for example, account-
ants, are currently under negotiation. To harmonise 
the recognition of the respective qualifications and 
skill sets, “Joint Committees” were established at the 
ASEAN level for the respective occupational groups. 
These joint committees are composed of national rep-
resentatives of the respective professional associations, 
for example the national architectural association, to 
define and institutionalise region-wide criteria for the 
provisions found in the MRAs.94 The actual institution-
alisation of joint provisions for the region-wide recog-
nition of qualifications and skill sets, however, is being 
hampered by quarrels over which specific definitions 
and criteria are to be applied as part of the process.95 
Also, some member states still lack a coherent stand-
ardisation of qualifications and skill sets for various 
professions at the national level, which effectively flat-
lines any implementation of the respective MRAs on 
the regional level. Finally, in the absence of a fully 
integrated labour market, it is the member states that, 
even after the implementation of the aforementioned 
MRAs, retain the power to grant visas and residency 
permits and determine which qualifications and skill 
sets to recognise (or not). 
Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 
The regional agenda on labour mobility has thus far 
been largely dominated by the three main recipient 
countries: Singapore, Malaysia, and, to a lesser extent, 
Thailand. The policy preferences of these states are 
shaped by the prevalence of industrialised and highly 
dynamic national economies with large service sec-
tors. They are also shaped by low birth rates and a cor-
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responding lack of qualified, specialised workers in 
some sectors of the economy. As a result, these states 
have viewed the influx of qualified workers from 
other ASEAN member states as being advantageous 
for their own economic development. Singapore, for 
example, hosts about 1.3 million foreign workers, and 
the concerted and highly selective recruitment of 
professionals is perceived to be an instrument for en-
hancing innovation and driving economic growth.96 
States with high birth rates, high unemployment 
levels, and a surplus of labour, such as the Philippines 
and Indonesia, have taken more conservative positions 
– vis-à-vis the prospect of an increasing regionalisation 
of labour migration – in order to protect their own 
domestic labour markets from any influx of foreign 
labour. In line with this, Indonesia’s Minister of Educa-
tion, Anies Baswedan, described the country’s demo-
graphic development as a potential future “time bomb” 
for the country’s volatile labour market.97 What Indo-
nesia has done, however, is to put the issue of low-
skilled migration, which for the most part originates 
from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar, onto 
the regional agenda. Over the last few years, critical 
reports on the fate of Indonesian migrant workers in 
Malaysia and Singapore have been steadily appearing 
in the domestic press.98 More specifically, it has been 
report topics that range from missing payments, the 
denial of basic labour rights, to outright abuse of 
Indonesian migrant workers that have increased the 
pressure on Jakarta to advocate for the rights of low-
skilled labourers on the regional level.99 Recent policy 
proposals by Jakarta – which tried to push for a bind-
ing code of conduct that would go beyond the non-
binding ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, signed in 
2007 – fell through due to the resistance of the three 
main recipient states: Singapore, Malaysia, and Thai-
land.100 
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Indonesia’s Perception and Position 
Indonesia’s rather conservative position on labour 
mobility in ASEAN is based on a perception that 
focusses heavily on the perceived disadvantages that 
would result from a more fully integrated regional 
labour market for Indonesia’s own domestic labour 
market and for the standing of qualifications and skill 
sets acquired in Indonesia. It is especially the fears 
over the loss of jobs for Indonesians if domestic jobs 
were to become available to highly qualified, profes-
sional workers from other ASEAN member states that 
is driving the domestic debate on labour mobility 
in the AEC. Indonesia’s Labour Ministry recently an-
nounced that – despite the fact that Indonesia is gen-
erally supportive of the goal of creating an AEC as well 
as the migration of foreign labour to the country – 
current legislation is not be changed to better suit the 
stipulations found in the respective regional agree-
ments. Indonesia’s current legislation sets strict bound-
aries on labour migration into the country from ab-
road. For example, work permits as well as residency 
permits generally expire after one year and, thus, have 
to be renewed on an annual basis. Companies hiring 
foreign workers are obligated to demonstrate to the 
authorities why the respective positions cannot be 
filled with Indonesian citizens. In addition, employers 
need to demonstrate that each foreign worker who 
fills a position is shadowed by two deputies – both of 
whom need to be Indonesians. The latter is to ensure a 
“knowledge transfer” from foreign professionals work-
ing in Indonesia to the domestic workforce. Thereby, 
Indonesian professionals are to benefit from the exper-
tise and experiences of foreign professionals.101 
Moreover, with millions of Indonesians without 
work or proper education, unions in Indonesia have 
repeatedly called for the government to shift its focus 
away from stronger regional integration of the labour 
market towards policies that will create jobs and re-
duce the rampant poverty within the country.102 This 
is not a position exclusively held by unionists though: 
Numerous business representatives have echoed similar 
misgivings. The deputy head of the Indonesian cham-
ber of commerce in Jakarta, Sarman Simanjorang, has 
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publicly voiced his apprehension over a possible 
influx of foreign labour into the domestic labour 
market. Examples used by Sarman – for which he 
failed to give further specifics, however – are from 
reports about large numbers of Filipino nurses who 
had allegedly begun to study Bahasa Indonesia.103 
Hence, the possible advantages for Indonesia from a 
region-wide liberalisation of labour migration – such 
as job opportunities for skilled Indonesia labour or the 
knowledge transfer into Indonesia via foreign workers 
– are often overshadowed by fears that Indonesians 
would inevitably lose out when competing for jobs 
with professionals from other ASEAN member states.104 
Accordingly, Indonesia’s Komite Nasional Ekonomi, 
an association of prominent economists, in its annual 
report for 2014 highlighted the danger of Indonesia 
becoming mainly a market for other member states in 
the context of it entering the AEC.105 These apprehen-
sions do not appear to be completely unfounded if one 
considers the analyses conducted by international 
organisations such as the World Bank. In their reports, 
international organisations have repeatedly pointed to 
the poor quality of Indonesia’s schools and its wider 
education system as one of the main causes for the 
country’s volatile labour market. Almost 70 per cent 
of Indonesia’s workers have not graduated from high 
school – a finding widely regarded as one of the ex-
planatory factors behind the shortages of highly quali-
fied professionals, particularly in occupations such 
as engineering.106 In contrast, more than 80 per cent 
of Singaporeans and Malaysians graduate from high 
school.107 Besides the low number of high school 
graduates in Indonesia, issues such as Indonesia’s com-
paratively low levels of productivity and competitive-
ness are frequently raised in the respective reports, too. 
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The shortage of highly qualified professionals in 
Indonesia is accompanied by an increasing domestic 
demand for highly skilled workers.108 A survey of Indo-
nesian employers revealed that more than 70 per cent 
of respondents in the manufacturing sector had diffi-
culties finding suitably skilled workers.109 With the 
launch of the AEC at the end of 2015 in mind, busi-
ness associations and labour unions have called for 
improvements in the training of Indonesia’s work-
force so that it can compete with skilled workers from 
other ASEAN member states.110 In general, the domestic 
debate on labour mobility almost exclusively focusses 
on the negative effects of regional economic integra-
tion and the potential for Indonesia’s workforce to fall 
behind those of other ASEAN member states. To make 
matters worse, Indonesia has been recording high 
population growth rates for years. More and more 
young employees are coming into the labour market 
in search of employment opportunities, which in turn 
has rendered any debate on the liberalisation of the 
domestic labour market a highly sensitive topic. 
Implementation in Indonesia 
The overwhelmingly critical views on labour mobility 
are attended by the patchy, incomplete implementa-
tion of regional agreements. Although MRAs for seven 
occupational groups have been signed at the regional 
level, their implementation has been hampered by a 
number of domestic constraints and limitations. Ac-
cording to a law amendment issued in 2008 by the 
Ministry of Manpower (with a number of further ex-
tensions made in 2013), foreign workers must provide 
proof of no less than five years of work experience, be 
able to speak Bahasa Indonesia, and be able to transfer 
their skill set and knowledge to an Indonesian worker 
during the course of their stay as part of a traineeship. 
On the other hand, companies wanting to employ for-
eign labour are obliged to outline the exact reasons as 
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to why the respective positions cannot be filled with 
Indonesian staff. Companies hiring foreigners are 
furthermore obliged to draw up detailed schedules on 
how and when foreign workers will be able to transfer 
their skill sets and knowledge to their Indonesian 
trainees. All of these documents are subject to approval 
by the Ministry of Manpower. Companies hiring for-
eigners are also required to file regular reports on the 
implementation of their respective trainee programmes 
to the Ministry of Manpower. 
Additional restrictions exist for a number of occu-
pational groups. For example, all medical personnel 
working in public hospitals and clinics by law have to 
be Indonesian. The labour mobility for engineers from 
other ASEAN member states is effectively restricted 
via quotas imposed on the number of foreign workers 
that can be employed in certain sectors as well as 
restrictive visa regulations.111 In the oil and gas sector, 
foreign workers above the age of 55 cannot be hired 
according to a law amendment issued in 2013.112 
According to the Minister of Manpower, Muhaimin 
Iskandar, the objective behind these and other similar 
measures is to bring more Indonesians into the upper 
echelons of companies while at the same time reducing 
the dependency on foreign workers.113 According to 
data published by the Ministry of Manpower, the law 
amendments were successful, in that they have led to 
a continuous reduction in foreign workers (both from 
ASEAN states and non-ASEAN states) over the last sev-
eral years. For example, whereas in 2012 the number 
of Malaysian citizens working in Indonesia was around 
5,300 people, their number sank to 3,425 in 2013. The 
data shows similar developments with regard to the 
number of Thais (2012: 4,146; 2013: 2,779) and Filipi-
nos (2012: 3,588; 2013: 2,168) working in the country.114 
The findings support the claim that Jakarta has 
been primarily implementing protectionist policies 
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recently in order to safeguard the domestic labour 
market against any potential influx of foreign work-
ers. Various national regulations and laws directly 
undermine regional agreements aimed at increasing 
intra-ASEAN labour mobility. To be sure, domestic 
opposition by business associations and trade unions 
is not the only factor that explains Indonesia’s pro-
tectionist stance; regional agreements have also been 
formulated in vague terms (e.g. with regard to the 
mutual recognition of qualifications) and lack clarity. 
Nonetheless, it seems safe to state that Jakarta’s main 
policy priority has been to protect its domestic labour 
market against any potential influx of foreign work-
ers. This position is based on a perception that views 
labour mobility primarily as a threat to its domestic 
workforce. To be fair, this is certainly nothing unique 
to Indonesia. A similar discourse is taking place in al-
most all other ASEAN member states.115 Nevertheless, 
it seems safe to state that the richer, economically 
more developed ASEAN member states have by and 
large followed more liberal, open policy preferences 
when it comes to labour mobility. Poorer, less eco-
nomically developed states, on the other hand, have 
implemented more protectionist policies. The respec-
tive policy preferences and their enactment, first and 
foremost, seem to correlate with national levels of 
supply and demand for skilled labour. Behind all of 
this lingers ASEAN’s broad development gap. Whereas 
developed countries such as Singapore have among 
the highest per capita income levels in the world and 
a modern, highly functional state apparatus, countries 
such as Laos are still classified as least developed. Indo-
nesia is certainly not classified as a least developed 
country. Nonetheless, the common focus in Indonesia 
is on the need to safeguard its domestic labour market 
against foreign competitors. This explains the fact that 
even numerous Indonesian business associations have 
ranged from being indifferent to being outright nega-
tive in their attitudes towards the AEC.116 As a result, 
Indonesia’s role in the AEC can for the most part be 
described as that of a foot-dragger rather than a driver 
of regional integration.117 
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Indonesia in the ASCC: Disaster Management 
Next to security policy, disaster management is actually 
one of the earliest policy fields to require regional 
cooperation within ASEAN. The first regional expert 
meeting on natural disasters took place as early as 
1971; the meeting was followed by the joint ASEAN 
Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters 
in 1976. Natural disasters and their management have 
directly affected – at different times and to different 
extents – all ASEAN member states. After all, South-
East Asia has been one of the most disaster-prone parts 
of the world in the last several decades. Hence, what 
distinguishes disaster management from other policy 
fields such as labour mobility or counter-terrorism – 
where, at least according to some member states, the 
advantages and disadvantages of regional integration 
are unequally distributed within ASEAN – is that 
ASEAN, with regard to disaster management, is not 
split into two or more camps with competing policy 
preferences.118 
Since the mid-2000s, almost 350,000 people have 
fallen victim to natural disasters in the region. More-
over, mega-catastrophes such as the Boxing Day tsu-
nami of 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and Typhoon 
Hainan in 2013 were not only costly in terms of 
human lives lost. They also generated immense nega-
tive repercussions in economic terms, in terms of 
human security, and in terms of reconstruction and 
development. Moreover, natural disasters have also 
proven to be costly in political terms: In cases of mis-
sing or inefficient emergency relief, local and national 
political elites have been confronted with mounting 
domestic and international criticism, at times accom-
panied by the complete loss of political legitimacy. 
And the future looks gloomy: The region has wit-
nessed a steady increase in the frequency and severity 
of natural disasters over the last 10 years, with no 
signs of the trend reversing. Indonesia has been one 
of the countries in South-East Asia hit the hardest by 
these developments. Aside from mega-disasters such 
as the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004, which destroyed 
large parts of the province of Aceh in northern Suma-
tra and cost up to 170,000 lives in Indonesia alone, 
various parts of the country have been hit almost on 
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an annual basis by earthquakes, mudslides, volcanic 
eruptions, and floods.119 
Regional Agreements 
The high frequency and severity of natural disasters in 
Indonesia and other parts of the region notwithstand-
ing, ASEAN cooperation in the field of disaster manage-
ment did not move beyond vague, non-binding decla-
rations of intent until 2005. In line with this, institu-
tional capacities for disaster management and early 
warnings at the regional level were also not devel-
oped. As a consequence, ASEAN proved to be absolute-
ly impotent and incompetent with regard to the orga-
nisation of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and 
reconstruction when confronted with the devastations 
caused by the tsunami on Boxing Day of 2004, which 
not only destroyed large parts of Aceh in Indonesia, 
but also cost the lives of thousands in Malaysia and 
Thailand. In the face of ASEAN’s failure to provide aid 
and relief, and under the eyes of the world, humani-
tarian aid and relief missions to the affected areas 
were coordinated by the United States. It was not until 
much later that ASEAN, through Singapore’s initiative, 
called an emergency meeting.120 In the face of the 
regional organisation’s apparent failure to effectively 
deal with a large-scale natural disaster, Singapore 
launched a new diplomatic initiative for increased 
regional coordination in disaster management, which 
resulted in the signing of the ASEAN Agreement 
on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
(AADMER). AADMER is not only one of the few legally 
binding ASEAN agreements, it is also the first legally 
binding regional agreement on disaster management 
in the world.121 
AADMER came into effect in 2009 with the aim 
of creating a number of preventive measures at the 
regional level to reduce the vulnerability of ASEAN 
as well as to establish a joint approach to regional co-
operation for emergency relief and disaster manage-
ment. Hence, AADMER does not simply focus on emer-
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gency relief but give equal attention to the establish-
ment of capacities for risk monitoring, prevention, 
and reconstruction, too.122 Furthermore, the agree-
ment’s appendix contains a so-called work programme. 
In the work programme, a number of specific steps 
towards increased regional cooperation and regional 
integration are listed, including timelines and set 
targets. Signatories to the agreement are obliged to 
report frequently on the implementation of the tar-
gets. Moreover, the agreement stipulates the establish-
ment of a regional coordination centre for disaster 
relief – the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humani-
tarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA 
Centre) – to facilitate coordination between national 
authorities, third states, and international organisa-
tions. The AHA Centre was inaugurated in 2011 and is 
based in Jakarta. Although AADMER is one of the few 
legally binding ASEAN agreements, nonetheless it 
does not provide for any sanctioning mechanisms for 
cases in which member states fail to comply with the 
terms of the agreement. 
Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 
Besides the aforementioned leading role played by 
Singapore in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, Indo-
nesia has been most actively engaged in the develop-
ment of regional disaster management. Indonesia’s 
regional leadership has undoubtedly been shaped by 
years of first-hand experience with natural disasters 
and has led Jakarta to actively push for closer coopera-
tion at the regional level. Although some observers 
have rightly pointed out that disaster management is, 
politically, one of the least sensitive policy fields for 
regional cooperation in which there is usually little to 
no domestic opposition by special interest groups,123 
reactions by governments to regional cooperation 
in the case of natural disasters have differed greatly. 
Whereas the Philippines and Indonesia were generally 
open to intra-regional cooperation as well as to co-
operation with third states and international organi-
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sations, Myanmar’s military junta effectively closed 
the country off from external aid and emergency relief 
in the wake of Cyclone Nargis over fears of interven-
tions into the country’s international affairs and a 
concerted destabilisation of the military regime.124 
It was not until the ASEAN secretary-general – who 
subsequently played the role of mediator between the 
junta and the international community after a num-
ber of closed-off talks with the junta – together with 
the foreign ministers of Singapore and Indonesia put 
pressure on Myanmar that the military leadership 
caved in and allowed humanitarian aid to flow into 
the country. Indonesia’s then-Foreign Minister Hassan 
Wirajuda, even went as far as to publicly insinuate 
the possibility of activating the UN’s Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) in case there was a protracted refusal 
by the junta to let humanitarian aid into the affected 
areas.125 It has been acknowledged that it was partly 
due to this resolute approach that the junta changed 
its position, which in turn made the establishment 
of the Tripartite Core Group for the coordination of 
external aid possible.126 
Jakarta also showed strong engagement with regard 
to the implementation of AADMER, and specifically 
the establishment of the AHA Centre. For instance, the 
Indonesian government offered to host the Centre in 
Jakarta and provided the needed premises and tech-
nical equipment, as well as most of the current mem-
bers of staff, who are Indonesian. To ensure the region-
wide implementation of ADDMER, the ASEAN Com-
mittee on Disaster Management, which is comprised 
of representatives of national disaster management 
agencies, set up working groups for specific aspects of 
disaster management to coordinate regional coopera-
tion. Each of these working groups is headed by a lead 
nation, so-called lead shepherds. Indonesia serves as 
lead shepherd in the fields of “early warning”,127 “dis-
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aster risk financing”128 as well as “recovery”, in con-
junction with Myanmar.129 
Indonesia’s Perception and Position 
Indonesia’s perception and its policy preferences, with 
their emphasis on a strong need to enhance regional 
cooperation on disaster management, have been shaped 
significantly by the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004. The 
tsunami illustrated in a very drastic manner the in-
adequacy of existing national and regional capacities 
for disaster management in the face of a mega-disas-
ter. In Jakarta’s view, this spurred a necessity for an 
enhanced, better integrated, and stronger institution-
alised regional cooperation mechanism for disaster 
management. Up until then, Jakarta had eyed any 
further regional integration with suspicion due to 
fears of breaching national sovereignty and possible 
external intervention in internal affairs. Faced with 
mega-disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, these fears 
began to take a back seat.130 
After 2004 the dominant view in Jakarta was one 
that, in the words of then-President Yudhoyono, had 
turned disaster management into a “national priority” 
because “natural disasters in all its forms – tsunamis, 
earthquakes, forest fires, floods, landslides, volcanic 
eruptions – have been the greatest threats to our 
national security and public well-being. They have 
caused more damages to property and to citizens’ lives 
than any other factors.”131 The Yudhoyono govern-
ment became a strong supporter of regional integra-
tion in the field of disaster management on the basis 
of the assumption that increased regional and inter-
national cooperation would make Indonesia “stronger” 
and “more secure”.132 
Because of this – and the corresponding political 
will to change national legislation, in line with the 
norms and set targets of regional agreements on dis-
aster management – the implementation of AADMER 
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has, according to observers, not met any noticeable 
domestic opposition so far. This is an experience that 
has not been shared by all other ASEAN member states. 
In Indonesia, the overwhelming majority of the politi-
cal elites as well as the bureaucracy regard the imple-
mentation of AADMER, which has been for the most 
part in the hands of Indonesia’s National Board for 
Disaster Management (BNPB), as a useful step for im-
proving domestic capabilities. At the same time, it 
appears to be widely believed that Indonesia’s own 
experiences and capabilities can be of use for develop-
ing enhanced capabilities for disaster management at 
the regional level as well as in other ASEAN member 
states.133 
Implementation in Indonesia 
The 2004 tsunami has certainly been a catalyst for the 
growing urgency to develop new – as well as upgrade 
existing – capabilities for disaster management and 
emergency relief, nationally and regionally. Since then, 
Indonesia has come to play a key role in the definition 
of the concrete terms of AADMER at the regional level 
while also implementing them at the national level. 
The National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(NAP DRR) was developed in 2006, followed by the 
enactment of the Disaster Management Law 24/2007 
the following year. The latter is congruent with the 
key terms of the regional agreement. Moreover, 
changes on the institutional level were also undertak-
en in line with the terms of AADMER. Jakarta created 
a national board for disaster management BNPB in 
2008, including the establishment of BNPB field 
offices at the provincial level.134 
Besides the legal and institutional changes, Jakarta 
also raised the budget for disaster management and 
relief. Between 2010 and 2013 alone, the BNPB’s budget 
and staff almost tripled. Indonesia’s efforts earned 
the country a lot praise and recognition at the inter-
national level, too. The United Nations awarded the 
honour of “Global Champion for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion” to then-President Yudhoyono in 2011 for leading 
the first state in the world towards compliance with 
the UN’s Hyogo Framework for Action at the national 
level in the form of the aforementioned Disaster 
Management Law. 
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Furthermore, Indonesia organised a number of 
regional disaster management trainings and manoeu-
vres, most of them within the ARF framework. Exam-
ples include the ASEAN Regional Forum for Disaster 
Relief Exercise in 2011 in Manado; the ARF Inter-
Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief in 2012; a con-
ference at the ministerial level on disaster risk 
reduction (Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster 
Risk Reduction) in 2012 in Yogyakarta; and the Menta-
wai-Megathrust earthquake simulation in 2014 in 
Padang, in which more than 20 different states partici-
pated. Hence, Indonesia has generally played a key 
role regionally in the field of disaster management 
since the mid-2000s. It was especially the 2004 tsuna-
mi, which took the lives of more than 160,000 Indo-
nesians, which rendered the importance of regional 
and international cooperation and the need to im-
prove the respective capacities to the country’s politi-
cal elites. Since then, Indonesia has not only success-
fully placed disaster management on the regional 
agenda but also played an active role in shaping 
regional and international cooperation in the field. 
Indonesia in the ASCC: 
Haze and Air Pollution 
The haze that engulfs large parts of maritime South-
East Asia – and the massive amounts of air pollution 
that come with it – is to a large extent caused by 
illegal slash-and-burn land clearing on Sumatra and 
the Indonesian part of Borneo (Kalimantan). The haze 
has been a recurring problem since the 1990s for Indo-
nesia and its neighbours. It is caused by clearing peat-
land with fire and is a health hazard for an estimated 
70 million people, which is reflected in the increase 
of haze-related skin and eye problems and chronic 
respiratory illnesses.135 It has caused significant eco-
nomic damage, too, impeding the transport sector, 
especially air transport. Schools, universities, fac-
tories, and government buildings have to be closed 
time and again because of exorbitantly high levels 
of air pollution. Tourist numbers have also been 
dropping in the affected areas.136 In addition, the 
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increase in illegal slash-and-burn land clearing activity 
has accelerated climate change. Indonesia is by now 
the world’s third-largest producer of CO2. To a large 
extent, the emissions are the result of large-scale forest 
fires being used to transform peatland into palm oil 
plantations.137 
When air pollution levels first skyrocketed as the 
result of the haze in 1997, two of Indonesia’s neigh-
bours most affected by it, Singapore and Malaysia, 
attempted to put the issue of haze on the regional 
agenda. As a result of external pressure and skyrocket-
ing air pollution levels, the Suharto government felt 
pressured to declare the haze a “national catastrophe”. 
In response, a number of new laws and decrees were 
passed that penalised land clearing by fire as well as 
the main purpose behind them: the illegal transfor-
mation of woodlands into palm oil plantations. Plans 
were made to improve the equipment and training of 
the fire brigades. In addition, the pressure from Singa-
pore and Malaysia at the regional level in reaction to 
the severe economic and health repercussions that 
the haze caused led to the launch of the Regional Haze 
Action Plan in December of 1997. On the basis of the 
action plan, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary 
Haze Pollution was signed by all ASEAN member states 
in 2002. 
Regional Agreements 
The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollu-
tion was preceded by numerous regional meetings 
and workshops on transnational air pollution that 
were held during the 1980s and 1990s. A Haze Tech-
nical Task Force was established in 1995, which sought 
to improve the coordination of the monitoring of 
forest fires between ASEAN member states. Generally, 
through the aforementioned working plan, attempts 
had been made to improve regional coordination 
since 1997. The working plan, however, was devoid 
of any legally binding guidelines. This shortcoming 
was to be amended through the signing of the ASEAN 
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002. 
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In contrast to the majority of ASEAN agreements, 
which tend to be non-binding, the agreement is one 
of the few legally binding ASEAN documents. It came 
into effect at the end of 2003 after it had been ratified 
by a majority of member states. Member states com-
mitted themselves to monitor the spread of forest fires 
and haze, as well as to extinguish fires and prevent 
their outbreak where possible. Among other things, 
by signing the agreement, member states committed 
themselves to legally prohibit land clearing through 
fire at the national level; to improve national fire 
prevention and management capacities; to strengthen 
local fire brigades; to increase awareness of – and edu-
cation on – the impacts of illegal slash-and-burn land 
clearing and fire prevention; to improve national fire-
monitoring capacities; and to set up research pro-
grammes on the causes and consequences of air pollu-
tion and haze. Although this long list of provisions 
is effectively legally binding, it is set in rather vague 
language, thus giving individual member states a lot 
of scope with regard to actual interpretations and 
implementation. For example, all signatories com-
mitted themselves to take on all necessary legal and 
bureaucratic steps to implement the agreement. How-
ever, the necessary steps were never precisely laid out 
and defined – neither in qualitative nor in quantita-
tive terms. Because of this, a precise examination of 
the degree of an individual member state’s compli-
ance with the agreement (or lack thereof) is almost 
impossible. Furthermore, the agreement is devoid 
of any sanctioning mechanisms in cases of non-com-
pliance, which, along with conflicts between signa-
tories, are solely to be resolved through consultations 
and negotiations. To improve the monitoring of exist-
ing fires, and to improve the coordination of fire 
management at the regional level, the agreement also 
stipulates the creation of a coordinating body, the 
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze 
Pollution Control. It is to collect data on the outbreak 
of fires, the development of haze, and the fire manage-
ment capacities for all the member states. Finally, the 
agreement calls for the establishment of a help fund – 
the ASEAN Haze Fund – to which member states can 
make contribution on a voluntary basis. 
Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 
Pressure to make the haze a regional issue as well as 
attempts to establish regional approaches and modes 
of coordination for its reduction were primarily made 
by those member states most affected by it. These were 
first and foremost Indonesia’s direct neighbours, Sin-
gapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Brunei and 
Thailand. From the viewpoints of Singapore and Kuala 
Lumpur, the haze was an issue that could only be 
resolved through the close cooperation of all affected 
countries. It was the two aforementioned states that 
were the first to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on Trans-
boundary Haze Pollution. Small states such as Singa-
pore have long favoured regional approaches to tackle 
the issue, mostly because they are aware of their lim-
ited capabilities (e.g. population size and economic 
power) to bilaterally influence Indonesia’s behaviour 
in accordance with their policy preferences. Hence, 
they have continued to work together with other 
ASEAN states in an attempt to resolve the issue at the 
regional level. The former Foreign Minister of Singa-
pore, Kasiviswanathan Shanmugam, emphasised the 
importance of ASEAN by stating that it was not pos-
sible for Singapore to exert much pressure on Indo-
nesia until the “haze” became a regional issue.138 In 
general, the “haze agreement”, as well as the respec-
tive regional institutions (e.g. the Haze Technical Task 
Force), came into existence through Singaporean 
leadership. This also includes the Sub-Regional Minis-
terial Steering Committee on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution, which is supposed to improve coordination 
between the affected states regarding the haze. It was 
also thanks to another initiative of Singapore during 
its Steering Committee chairmanship that the deci-
sion was taken to implement a monitoring system 
(Sub-Regional Haze Monitoring System), with the 
purpose of documenting hotspots all over maritime 
South-East Asia.139 Furthermore, Singapore (in 2007) 
and Malaysia (in 2008) signed memorandums with 
Indonesia on the provision of technical assistance to 
fight fires. Moreover, Singapore and Malaysia, as the 
two states most affected by the haze, continuously 
exerted pressure on Indonesia to actually ratify the 
haze agreement. Almost annually, Singapore and 
Kuala Lumpur addressed protest letters to Jakarta 
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demanding a more vigorous response to the problems 
associated with illegal slash-and-burn land clearing in 
Indonesia. They also badgered Jakarta to hold various 
ministerial-level meetings about the haze every year. 
These efforts were also being made due to the rising 
levels of domestic pressure on the governments of Sin-
gapore and Malaysia to get tougher on Indonesia. A 
recent study on news reporting on transnational air 
pollution found that the number of articles openly 
criticising Indonesia for its failure to ratify the haze 
agreement and to prosecute the culprits behind the 
illegal fires had sharply risen since the mid-2000s. 
One can infer that these media reports shaped public 
opinion towards Indonesia in an equivalently negative 
way, thus exerting additional pressure on the respec-
tive governments to act.140 
Indonesia’s Perception and Position 
The external pressure put by Singapore and Malaysia 
on Jakarta was condemned across party lines and 
institutions as illegitimate meddling into Indonesia’s 
internal affairs. In reaction to what was perceived as 
attempts to compromise Indonesian sovereignty, 
sand exports to Singapore, among other things, were 
halted.141 An example of the brusque manner in 
which Indonesia reacted to the criticism of its inertia 
on the haze issue from other ASEAN states is a 
statement by then-Minister for Welfare and Social 
Security, Agung Laksono, who in 2013 depicted 
Singapore’s complaints as being “childish” and 
described the haze as a mere “natural phenome-
non”.142 In the spring of 2015, Vice-President Jusuf 
Kalla made headlines by publicly dismissing Singapo-
rean complaints over the haze by stating: “For 11 
months, they enjoyed nice air from Indonesia and 
they never thanked us. They have suffered because of 
the haze for one month and they get upset”.143 
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Jakarta’s often rather brusque and broad-brushed 
public reaction across party lines and institutions 
should, however, not belie the fact that, with regard to 
the haze issue, the Indonesian polity has been split 
into various camps. During the two tenures of 
President Yudhoyono, the executive has been a vocal 
supporter of the rapid ratification of the haze 
agreement. In 2006 Yudhoyono called for a “war 
against haze”, made apologies to Indonesia’s neigh-
bours, and called on his government to move decisively 
against illegal land clearing.144 For Yudhoyono the 
haze was not just a health issue or an economic issue, 
he also perceived it as tainting Indonesia’s interna-
tional image.145 Yudhoyono furthermore linked the 
haze issue with the debate on climate change146 by 
drawing a direct connection between more sustain-
able forestry management in Indonesia and lowering 
CO2 emissions.147 
However, attempts by the Yudhoyono administra-
tion to push for a rapid ratification of the haze agree-
ment failed. The respective bill failed to pass Indone-
sia’s parliament because a majority of parliamentar-
ians thought it would violate Indonesia’s national 
sovereignty. It was also criticised for essentially only 
serving the interests of Indonesia’s neighbours, while 
at the same time neglecting Indonesian demands for 
stronger regional efforts against other transnational 
phenomena, such as illegal logging and timber trade 
and illegal fishing, which were largely being ignored 
at the regional level.148 Many parliamentarians viewed 
the blockade of the ratification of the haze agreement 
as a way to increase Indonesia’s leverage to push for a 
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broader environmental protection agreement at the 
regional level. That agreement was to include other 
issues aside from the haze issue, such as illegal fishing 
and illegal logging. The fact that some of the palm oil 
companies allegedly involved in illegal land clearing 
were owned by Singaporean and Malaysian business-
men was also repeatedly raised in parliament in order 
to further prolong the ratification process.149 
Implementation in Indonesia 
Until the Indonesian parliament finally ratified the 
haze agreement in September 2014, after a 12-year 
delay, the country was widely perceived as being a 
foot-dragger. Although the Indonesian parliament’s 
foot-dragging and Jakarta’s often abrasive rhetoric 
were rightfully criticised, it needs to be noticed that 
Jakarta had effectively implemented various regula-
tions of the haze agreement long before it finally 
ratified the agreement in 2014. For example, a “zero 
burning policy” had been established as early as 2001 
via a country-wide ban on fire clearing (Government 
Regulation 4/2001). Another example is the Law on 
Environmental Management and Protection from 
2009, which criminalised fire clearing. Those found 
guilty of fire clearing face prison sentences. Also, fire 
regulations for plantation owners were tightened and 
non-observance became punishable by fines or, in 
extreme cases, prison sentences.150 
The fact that Indonesian laws in many ways corre-
sponded with the haze agreement’s regulations was, 
however, not tantamount to a reduction in haze. 
Quite the contrary, various studies point out that the 
number of incidents of fire clearing, as well as their 
size and scope, has actually increased over the last few 
years.151 In 2014 a record number of fires were counted 
on Indonesian soil. At the time of writing (autumn of 
2015), large parts of Sumatra and Borneo are engulfed 
in the haze because of dozens of illegal incidents of 
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fire clearing.152 At the same time, other studies illus-
trate how the number of hectares of woodland and 
peatland converted into palm oil plantations on Suma-
tra and Kalimantan almost tripled between 2001 and 
2011.153 Indonesia, however, has not just failed to 
reduce the number of fires; it has also fallen behind 
with regard to other key aspects of the haze agree-
ment. The capacities of the fire brigades were not 
boosted in a noteworthy manner, fire clearing was not 
systematically monitored, and effective fire preven-
tion mechanisms were not implemented. Cooperation 
with other ASEAN member states only takes place 
when fires have already broken out – and even then, 
cooperation is usually very slow and ineffective.154 
It needs to be mentioned at this point that Indo-
nesia’s failure to fully implement the haze agreement 
and reduce the number of fires is not simply due to a 
lack of political will in Jakarta. The situation is further 
complicated by a decentralisation of decision-making 
authority on environmental governance as part of 
Indonesia’s general decentralisation process after the 
fall of Suharto. Decision-making authority on a num-
ber of important issues, for example the issuing of 
plantation permits, has been shifted from the national 
to the district level (or in some cases to the province 
level). According to two laws (Law No. 22/1999 and Law 
No. 32/2004), the management of natural resources as 
well as key aspects of environmental protection became 
heavily decentralised. Decision-making authority on 
the conversion of woodlands into plantations up to a 
size of 1,000 hectares has been taken from the hands 
of government officials in Jakarta. The same is true for 
the criminal prosecution of fire clearing and illegal 
land conversions, on which authority now also rests 
with local government agencies.155 The diffusion of 
decision-making authority has opened the door for 
collusion between local officials, security forces, and 
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palm oil plantations, which is at least partly to blame 
for Indonesia’s piecemeal implementation of the haze 
agreement. Furthermore, Yudhoyono in many ways 
thwarted his very own “war against haze” by simulta-
neously calling for an expansion of palm oil produc-
tion in Indonesia, which currently is the world’s biggest 
palm oil producer.156 According to plans made by his 
successor, Jokowi, palm oil production is even pre-
dicted to double by 2020. Hence, political priorities in 
Jakarta have to some extent shifted away from a narra-
tive emphasising a “war against haze”, sustainable 
forest governance, and a reduction of CO2 emissions, 
and towards a focus on rapid economic growth. This 
has only further hampered the full implementation 
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Recent Developments under the Jokowi Administration 
 
According to some observers, indication of a change in 
Indonesian foreign policy was already visible shortly 
after Jokowi took office in late 2014. Jokowi, who was 
widely deemed to be inexperienced in international 
affairs, openly criticised “Western dominated” inter-
national institutions such as the United Nations and 
the International Monetary Fund. He also gave orders 
to sink fishing vessels, mostly from other ASEAN mem-
ber states, caught fishing illegally in Indonesian waters. 
In addition, he ended the moratorium on executions 
for drug traffickers, which had been established 
during the term of his predecessors. The execution of 
two Australian citizens caused a firestorm of criticism 
in Australia and led to Canberra recalling its ambassa-
dor to Indonesia. Both moves – the executions of drug 
traffickers and the hardline policy against illegal fish-
ing – were favourably received by the majority of 
the Indonesian public and the press though. Within 
months of Jokowi taking office, major differences 
started to emerge between Jokowi’s “national inter-
est”-driven foreign policy and the “1000 friends, zero 
enemies” foreign policy paradigm established under 
his predecessor.157 With regard to the ASEAN Economic 
Community, Jokowi stated that he would only support 
regional integration measures if they did not run 
counter to Indonesia’s national interests. According 
to various media reports, the president also has so far 
shown very little understanding of ASEAN’s protracted, 
drawn-out decision-making process.158 One of his close 
foreign policy advisors bluntly argued that ASEAN was 
not “the” cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy 
anymore but merely “one” cornerstone of many.159 At 
the heart of the Jokowi administration’s foreign policy 
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is Jokowi’s very own idea of Indonesia as a “maritime 
fulcrum”. It is aimed at rapidly developing the mari-
time resources and maritime connectivity of the archi-
pelagic state as well as towards cooperating more 
closely with Indonesia’s littoral states in the Indian 
Ocean and Pacific Ocean. To achieve these aims, mari-
time infrastructure, especially the country’s many 
dilapidated ports, is to be restored and strengthened, 
its navy upgraded, and its national fishery industry is 
to be better protected from neighbouring states’ fish-
ing fleets illegally operating in Indonesian waters. All 
the aforementioned developments have been inter-
preted as signs of an increasingly inward-looking Indo-
nesian foreign policy, which in turn has the country 
turning away from its leadership role in ASEAN.160 
If one moves beyond the often unemotional, matter-
of-fact rhetoric on ASEAN, Jokowi’s ASEAN policy is 
actually no more or less ambivalent towards regional 
integration than that of his predecessors. With regard 
to the APSC, there are few, if any, indicators of Indo-
nesia turning away from ASEAN under Jokowi. In the 
context of debates on issues relating to regional secu-
rity, Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and Foreign Minister 
Retno Marsudi have repeatedly referred to ASEAN 
as the most important instrument for Indonesia’s 
attempts to foster regional security and stability in 
Asia.161 Jakarta also emphatically supported efforts 
to forge a unified ASEAN position on the South China 
Sea conflict during the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lum-
pur in 2015. Very much like her predecessor, Foreign 
Minister Marsudi urged the conflicting parties to con-
clude a legally binding Code of Conduct for the South 
China Sea, which Indonesia continues to view as the 
key tool to manage tensions there. Indonesia has made 
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no territorial claims in the South China Sea and, thus, 
is not a claimant state. Jokowi himself has recurrently 
tried to draw attention to Indonesia’s possible role as 
an honest broker in the conflict. And Defence Minister 
Ryamizard Ryacudu suggested the establishment of 
“joint peace patrols” in the South China Sea at the 
Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015. Regarding the recent 
“migration crisis” involving mostly Rohingyas arriving 
by boat, as well as the connections between local 
Islamist militants and ISIS, the Jokowi administration 
has also stuck to long-established foreign policy pat-
terns by actively seeking to foster increased regional 
cooperation in ASEAN and beyond on these issues.162 
Moreover, a few months after Jokowi took office, 
Indonesia finally ratified the ASEAN haze agreement. 
To reduce the overlapping of competencies between 
the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of For-
estry over issues such as land use rights or the licens-
ing of palm oil plantations, both ministries have been 
merged into the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. 
Additionally, the highly complex licensing processes 
for the establishment of palm oil plantations were 
streamlined. Prior to that, the process involved numer-
ous government agencies with at times overlapping 
competences, thus opening up multiple avenues for 
corruption and collusion. In conjunction with local 
and national disaster management agencies, the fire 
brigade, and the Ministry of Environment and Forest-
ry, Jokowi’s cabinet tried to identify areas at high risk 
from an outbreak of forest fires in order to be able to 
take precautionary measures to prevent so-called hot-
spots. A number of corporate executives have been 
arrested in connection with illegal forest fires on 
Sumatra and Kalimantan.165 Furthermore, under the 
Jokowi administration, a hotspot tracking system 
has been established, whose datasets are publicly 
accessible via the internet.163 All these measures, how-
ever, did not prevent the outbreak of large fires in 
the autumn of 2015. Much less activism has been dis-
played by the Jokowi administration in other fields 
of the ASCC such as disaster management. Jokowi did 
pay a visit to a refugee camp inhabited by people dis-
placed from their homes due to the outbreak of Mount 
Sinabung volcano, but other than that, little is known 
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so far about his priorities and plans in the field of 
disaster management.164 
What has been frequently observed is a reinforce-
ment of Indonesia’s general reluctance over increased 
economic integration in the context of the AEC, and 
the protectionist economic policies launched by 
Jakarta in response to that under Jokowi. For example, 
in July 2015 the import tariffs for a large number of 
consumer goods – ranging from food to automobile 
parts – were raised (in some cases quite drastically). 
The government stated dwindling local demand 
coupled with increased foreign competition as the 
reason for the tariff hikes, arguing that local produc-
ers needed to be protected from foreign competition. 
The non-tariff trade barriers and restrictive controls 
on foreign investments have also been maintained by 
the current administration.165 Quite the contrary, it 
was reported that the Ministry of Trade is currently 
working on a draft bill that would establish domestic 
content requirements for the telecommunications and 
automobile sectors. Moves like these have been unani-
mously supported by the national trade association.166 
Moreover, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in 
2015 put increased pressure on the government to 
protect local products via new tariffs and non-tarrif 
trade barriers before the AEC came into power on the 
31 December 2015. At the same time, trade union rep-
resentatives voiced their concerns over the negative 
effect that increased labour mobility – as part of the 
AEC – would have on the Indonesian labour market. 
Hence, so far the Jokowi government has by and large 
acted on general apprehensions over the AEC and 
fears over the country’s lack of competitiveness and it 
becoming little more than a marketplace for produc-
ers based in other ASEAN member states in particular. 
A number of cabinet members have made public state-
ments calling for a sluggish, protracted implementa-
tions of various AEC regulations in order to protect 
Indonesian companies and workers from foreign com-
petitors. During a discussion on the AEC in early 2015, 
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Jokowi seconded this particular discourse by reiterat-
ing his apprehension over the prospect of Indonesia 
becoming a mere playground for incoming foreign 
businesses that would squash local businesses. He also 
stated that if this scenario were to unfold, he would 
cease to support the implementation of the AEC im-
mediately. Therefore, it seems safe to state that, for 
the time being, the discourse on the AEC can to a large 
extent still best be characterised as apprehensive. The 
focus of the debate in Indonesia is primarily on how 
Indonesian businesses and workers might be able to 
not lose out, rather than on how they could win or 
profit from the AEC. Thus, business representative 
and trade union representatives alike are pushing for 
greater protection from the government.167 Therefore, 
Jokowi currently appears to be trapped between two 
currently contradictory policy preferences. On the one 
hand, he has made calls to open up the Indonesian 
economy to foreign investments and has tried to woo 
investors at international forums. His speech at the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in late 
2014, for example, ended with a direct plea for foreign 
investors to come to Indonesia. Yet, on the other hand, 
he needs to please domestic interests by portraying 
himself as a president that protects Indonesian com-
panies and workers and does not sell the country out 
to foreign interests. Thus far, the focus of the Jokowi 
government seems to be more on the protectionist 
side of things. Indonesia’s growing protectionism has 
observers worried over the future trajectory of the 
AEC, which took effect at the end of 2015, and its key 
objective of creating a common market for goods, 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Indonesia’s main policy preferences and interests vis-à-
vis ASEAN in general, and regional integration in 
particular, historically lie in the area of security and 
defence. This study has shown that this is still the case 
to this day. Close examination of the two policy fields 
of counter-terrorism and conflict management revealed 
Indonesia’s crucial role in the development of the 
APSC – the ASEAN Community’s first pillar – by pro-
viding ideas and policy concepts, as well as serving 
as an agenda-setter, at the regional level. In line with 
this, the country has implemented the relevant re-
gional agreements. Jakarta has also launched a num-
ber of regional initiatives in the field of foreign and 
security policy. Moreover, worries that Indonesia 
under Jokowi could turn away from ASEAN appear 
to be (at least to an extent) hyperbolical, because no 
convincing evidence for such assessments was found 
in the area of security and defence. ASEAN is still 
viewed by Jakarta as being the centre of the regional 
security architecture. It is also still viewed as the main 
tool to maintain regional security and stability. Ac-
cordingly, Indonesia’s key interest and policy prefer-
ences in the field of security and defence at various 
points converge with those of Germany and the EU 
in East Asia. This convergence could become the basis 
for developing further close cooperation. 
One example is Jakarta’s preference for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and the basis of international 
law, which is also shared by Germany and the EU. In 
line with this, Indonesia has identified the diverging 
positions and policy preferences of the ASEAN mem-
ber states – and the lack of an ASEAN institutionalised 
mechanism to offset these – as major stumbling blocks 
in the way of a coherent ASEAN policy on the South 
China Sea conflict. Jakarta has furthermore consist-
ently decried the lack of a coherent ASEAN policy 
on the South China Sea as being detrimental to the 
region’s security and stability. In order to support 
Indonesia in its efforts to establish avenues for conflict 
resolution in the South China Sea, the EU would be 
well advised to prioritise the issue of intraregional 
conflict resolution mechanisms on the agendas of 
future EU-ASEAN High-Level Dialogues on Maritime 
Security. To enhance trust and confidence-building 
efforts in the region and beyond – a point repeatedly 
stressed by Jakarta – policy-makers in Europe should 
consider the possibility of joint manoeuvres and joint 
trainings of European and South-East Asian coast-
guards in the field of search-and-rescue operations. It 
would certainly be helpful to strengthen the exchange 
of ideas and experiences between Europe and South-
East Asia on issues such as intelligence cooperation 
and de-radicalisation. In all these fields, Indonesia cer-
tainly has the potential to serve as a close partner of 
Europe in the region. 
Close cooperation with Jakarta, however, is not 
necessarily to be limited to the first pillar (the APSC). 
There are various policy fields in the third pillar, the 
ASCC, in which Indonesia’s policy preference and 
interests converge with those of the EU, and in which 
the country has taken on a regional leadership role. 
This is true, for example, for the field of human rights 
as well as for the field of disaster management, which 
has undergone close scrutiny as part of this study. 
With regard to the latter, the EU would be well ad-
vised to expand its efforts in the ASEAN Crisis Centres 
Project with its purpose of capacity-building for the 
AHA Centre. Supporting the establishment of regional 
institutions such as the AHA Centre in Jakarta – in 
whose establishment Indonesia has played a leading 
role – appears to be a good way to keep the country 
committed to its leadership role, while at the same 
time providing additional benefits for the whole 
region. There are other policy fields in the ASCC, how-
ever, where Indonesia has played a not so commend-
able role regionally. This is especially true for air pol-
lution and the haze issue. It is the ever-expanding 
transformation of pristine peatland and rainforests 
into palm oil plantations via illegal slash-and-burn 
tactics that is at the core of the haze that engulfs large 
parts of archipelagic South-East Asia annually. This is 
for the most part because Indonesia still lags far behind 
in its implementation of, and compliance with, best 
practices. Not only was Indonesia the last ASEAN 
member state to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution in late 2014, but the 
country is also an underachiever with regard to 
various crucial aspects of the agreement. Against this 
background, it appears to be of great importance for 
international donors such as the EU to expand their 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin 






existing pilot projects on sustainable forestry manage-
ment. Next to standing cooperation with local part-
ners in the area of sustainable forestry management, 
additional resources should be earmarked for local 
capacity-building to better monitor new concessions. 
Besides that, European donors should consider launch-
ing capacity-building programmes on forest fire fight-
ing to help Indonesia bolster its own capacities. Seeing 
that the boom in the palm oil sector is not simply 
supply-driven, Europe – as a major importer of biofuel 
– should commit itself to limit the ratio of biofuels of 
the so-called first generation (wheat, rapeseed, corn, 
and palm oil) to no more than 5 per cent – the ratio 
originally tabled by the European Commission but 
later raised to 7 per cent due to pressures from mem-
ber states with high biofuel usage. Additionally, Euro-
pean states should enact clearer sustainability criteria 
for the import of palm oil nationally and at the Euro-
pean level. Currently, a number of loopholes exist, es-
pecially in the food industry, which need to be closed. 
With regard to the ASEAN community’s second 
pillar, the ASEAN Economic Community, Indonesia’s 
self-portrayal as a driver of regional integration pro-
cesses does not mirror its specific policy preferences 
and its observable behaviour. Indonesia’s policies on 
the AEC are predominantly protectionist. Large parts 
of the country’s elite – political and economic – are 
apprehensive towards more regional economic inte-
gration over fears that this would compromise Indo-
nesia’s sovereignty and harm the interests of local 
businesses and workers. These fears have clearly come 
to shape Indonesian perceptions and policies in the 
two fields under study in this paper: labour mobility 
and the single aviation market. The implementation 
of regional agreements to liberalise air traffic among 
the member states was either delayed (MAAS) or se-
verely limited (MAFLPAS) by Jakarta. Access to Indo-
nesia’s domestic aviation market for foreign carriers 
was further constrained by tightened security regu-
lations and the reduction of takeoff and landing 
positions available at some of Indonesia’s international 
airports. A similar impression unfolds when studying 
Indonesia’s attitudes and regional behaviour in the 
field of labour mobility. Attempts at the regional level 
to facilitate greater mobility of high-skilled workers 
within the ASEAN region have been met with tacit 
(and at times open) refusal by Jakarta. Indonesia has 
been very hesitant to implement the respective regional 
agreements over widespread fears that the country’s 
own workforce would be unable to compete with 
those of other ASEAN member states such as Malaysia 
and Singapore, and thus end up at the losing end with 
regard to freedom of movement. Various integration 
measures laid out in the AEC blueprint have only been 
partially attended to by Jakarta, whereas others have 
been met with outright neglect. Hence, it is the AEC, 
which is deemed most important by Europe as well 
as most of Jakarta’s neighbours, for which few (if any) 
future policy initiatives towards a deeper regional 
integration are to be expected from Jakarta. On the 
contrary, the findings of this study suggest that the 
long-held protectionist attitudes in Jakarta might 
harden throughout Jokowi’s term of office. Therefore, 
European policy-makers in general need to grapple 
with Indonesia’s apprehensiveness towards deeper 
economic integration with ASEAN and how this might 
possibly impact on the future of the AEC. For example, 
the assumption that the establishment of the ASEAN 
Community by the end of 2015 would breathe new life 
into EU-ASEAN talks over an inter-regional free trade 
agreement, which has been effectively gridlocked 
since 2009, might have to be revised given the findings 
of this study. Instead, any resumption of talks should 
take into account Indonesia’s hesitant attitude and 
associated policy preferences. Where necessary, part-
nerships with other South-East Asian states should be 
intensified and further developed. Another example is 
the proposed comprehensive air transport agreement 
between the EU and ASEAN, in which policy-makers 
can expect Indonesia to play the role of restrainer, 
rather than driver, of the process. 
This, however, should not suggest that all possible 
avenues for cooperation with Jakarta are essentially 
closed off. Because of issues such as labour mobility 
being so politically sensitive, cooperation should take 
a detour via higher education. More precisely, under 
the banner of “Indonesia pintar” (smart Indonesia), 
the internationalisation of Indonesian universities has 
been part and parcel of Jokowi’s presidential camp. 
One of the main factors hampering a further inter-
nationalisation of Indonesian universities, as desired 
by the Jokowi administration, is the lack of mutual 
recognition of university degrees, examination re-
quirements, and credit points within ASEAN. This 
could be taken up by the EU by offering an exchange 
of ideas and best practices on how to improve student 
mobility regionally. To be sure, the European experi-
ence in the shape of the Bologna process is certainly 
not directly transferrable to South-East Asia as ASEAN 
strives for a region-wide standardisation of university 
degrees and credit points (European Credit Transfer 
and Accumulation System). Nonetheless, an exchange 
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of ideas, best practices, and concrete experiences on 
the prospects and the stumbling blocks of a range of 
specific internationalisation measures that were taken 
by European universities in the past could be of inter-
est to Indonesia and other ASEAN member states. 
On the operational level, the existing EU pro-
grammes promoting economic integration in ASEAN 
should be reviewed while keeping the widespread 
apprehension and resistance in Indonesia towards the 
AEC in mind. So far, the majority of EU programmes 
have focussed on capacity-building in the ASEAN sec-
retariat, that is, with regard to the harmonisation of 
technical standards, while largely ignoring the indi-
vidual member states and their respective business 
communities. In Indonesia the latter largely consists 
of small and medium-sized enterprises, which is very 
similar to how the business community is structured 
in EU member states such as Germany. Although 
capacity-building within the ASEAN secretariat is im-
portant, more could be done to directly involve South-
East Asian business communities. This could be done 
through an open, hands-on-oriented exchange forum 
between, for example, German and Indonesian busi-
nessmen on the prospects and perils that the estab-
lishment of a single market can bring for companies. 
At the time of finalising this study (early 2016), 
Indonesia has failed to deliver concrete ideas on the 
future development of the ASEAN Community and 
ASEAN as a whole from 2016 onwards. The Jokowi 
administration has been rather remiss with regard to 
crafting a vision of the direction of ASEAN’s mid- and 
long-term development. Diplomatic circles have main-
tained that the main reason behind this is a general 
lack of interest within the administration on all 
things ASEAN in particular – and foreign policy in 
general.169 European policy-makers in meetings with 
their Indonesian counterparts should therefore raise 
expectations about Indonesia’s role as a driver of 
the regional integration processes. In international 
forums such as the G20, Indonesian membership and 
global status should be linked to its role in ASEAN. The 
EU should openly convey the opinion that Indonesia’s 
global status is tightly intertwined with its regional 
role to prevent Indonesia turning away from ASEAN. 
Therefore, existing cooperation schemes with Indo-
nesia as well as ASEAN should be carefully maintained 
and, if possible, expanded. Hereby, Europe is in a spe-
cial position: For the time being, no other external 
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Affairs, Berlin, 16 June 2015. 
actor has shown so much interest in fostering regional 
institutions and integration processes in South-East 
Asia. With this position comes a particular responsi-
bility. Hence, Europe would be well advised to closely 
engage with Indonesia, with whom it shares key values 
and strategic interests, in order to better pursue its 
own future ambitions in South-East Asia. 
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